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Dead skin: Theorizing representations of HIV/AIDS 
Kambili Husbands 
 
In this study, I argue that early depictions of HIV/AIDS in the mainstream media 
displayed a marked emphasis on the skin. I locate these depictions within a history of Western 
preoccupation with skin as a symbol of social belonging, bodily integrity, and modern selfhood. I 
also maintain that these depictions played a crucial role in constituting both the epidemic as a 
whole and the bodies associated with it. I draw connections between skin studies, queer theory, 
and critical disability theory in order to uncover some of the ways in which the skin acts as a 
repository for cultural imaginings of selfhood, good health, and psychosocial wellbeing. In 
keeping with my interest in the intersections of sexuality and disability studies, my thesis is 
organized into three related chapters: 1) sexuality and the skin; 2) disability and the skin; and 3) 
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More than twenty years ago American critical health theorist, Paula Treichler (1987), 
wrote that “[…] AIDS is a story, or multiple stories, read to a surprising extent from a text that 
does not exist: the body of the male homosexual” (p. 42). Yet, HIV/AIDS has not only been 
etched “onto” the gay male body, or read from its surface, but has itself been constituted through 
a discursive repetition that sutures one to the other. Inspired by Treichler’s polemic I want to 
consider how the skin serves as a template for normative ideas about sexuality and sexual health 
such that queer bodies are “skinned” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 44) in particular ways and sexual 
deviancy is read from (and written on) the body’s surface. I argue that early depictions of 
HIV/AIDS in the mainstream media displayed a marked emphasis on the skin. I locate these 
depictions within a history of Western preoccupation with the skin as a symbol of social 
belonging, bodily integrity, and modern selfhood. I also maintain that these depictions played a 
crucial role in the constituting both the epidemic as a whole and the bodies associated with it. 
The aim of my project will be to draw connections between skin studies, queer theory, and 
critical disability theory in order to uncover some of the ways in which the skin acts as a 
repository for cultural imaginings of selfhood, good health, and psychosocial wellbeing (Ahmed 
& Stacey, 2001; Benthien, 2002; Connor, 2004; Emberley, 2008; Patterson & Schroeder, 2012; 
Pitts-Taylor, 2003; Segal, 2009). In keeping with my interest in the intersections of sexuality and 
disability studies, I have organized my thesis into three related chapters: 1) disability and the 
skin; 2) sexuality and the skin; and 3) death and the skin. While I maintain that these themes are 
both linked to and shaped by the others, I find it analytically useful to make distinctions among 
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them in order to make clearer and more nuanced arguments. I examine how it is that cultural 
anxieties relating to homosexuality, disability, and death coalesce in representations of 
HIV/AIDS such that the meaning of each becomes dependent on the meaning of the others. 
Scholarly interest in the social, psychic, and political meanings and practices associated 
with the skin has steadily emerged over the last twenty years. A range of scholars have 
undertaken cultural histories of the skin (see Benthien, 2002; Connor, 2004). There is also 
burgeoning psychoanalytic interest in the skin (see Anzieu, 1989; Lafrance, 2009; Segal, 2009). 
Cultural criticism has also interjected a range of issues concerning the cultural significance of 
skin, including racialization, cosmetic surgery and body modification, and illness and disability 
(see Ahmed & Stacey, 2001; Emberley, 2012; Pitts-Taylor, 2003). What these diverse scholars 
demonstrate is that the surface of the body is critical in the formation of the self and its 
relationship to the world; not simply in terms of a biological or psychological reality, but as a 
scripted surface upon and from which we make sense of our relation to others (Ahmed, 2000, p. 
49). Critical skin studies literature has emerged in large part out of feminist, queer, and post-
colonial concerns over the body: in their “return” to the body, skin studies scholars privilege the 
body’s surface as a specific and multidimensional object of inquiry into social, political, and 
psychic life. 
My research focuses on the ways in which meaning (and in this case, the meaning of 
HIV/AIDS) is grafted, read, and transformed on the skin. How is difference marked on and 
through the skin? What do our skins say, to whom, and in what context? How is the skin put in 
the service of constituting some subjects as normal and some as abnormal? If “the skin is always 
open to being read,” (Ahmed & Stacey, p. 1) then how are we reading it? And what are some of 
the effects of these readings? At the same time as the skin provides a superficial boundary 
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between bodies it also makes visible those forms of difference that may not be so readily 
apparent. Stigmatized skins—skins which transgress normative “rules” of embodiment and 
appearance—matter insofar as they stand in for what we cannot see. For instance, in current 
diagnostic manuals the appearance of Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS) on a patient under sixty years of 
age “is considered an unambiguous demonstration of the AIDS process”, even if the patient is 
HIV negative (Yang, 2001, p. 327). KS derives its meaning more through what it represents 
(HIV leading to death) than what it is (an otherwise manageable cancer, though rare). In other 
words, it is not the disabling aspect of skin disease that is itself the problem; it is the way in 
which skin disorder signifies the suggestion of “abnormality” and the potential of disability, that 
is often most troubling.  
My interest in the skin has led me to focus on KS as, according to Yang, an “index of 
AIDS” (p. 326). KS is a rare form of cancer that presents as dark, purple lesions on the skin, 
mucous membranes, and internal organs. While virtually unknown to the general population 
before the AIDS epidemic, KS entered public discourse in the early 1980s following the 
diagnosis of several gay men in the New York area (Carter & Hughson, 2012). These men, as we 
now know, were eventually diagnosed with what has come to be known as Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome, leading to a medical distinction between “classic” Kaposi’s sarcoma—a 
slow progressing, and relatively benign cancer—and “AIDS-associated” Kaposi’s sarcoma—the 
“aggressive and frequently fatal epidemic variant” (Antman & Chang, 2000). From 1981-1985 
nearly one-third of people diagnosed with AIDS had visible KS lesions (Grover, p. 12). Today, 
more than 90 percent of people living with HIV/AIDS (PHAs) will develop some form of 
opportunistic skin conditions during the course of illness (Yang, p. 325).  
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Focusing on depictions of HIV/AIDS from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, I consider 
two highly influential AIDS texts: the 1993 Jonathan Demme film Philadelphia, set in the city of 
Philadelphia in the early 1990s, as well as the 2003 miniseries Angels in America (itself a film 
adaptation of the 1993 Tony Kushner play entitled Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on 
National Themes), which takes place between 1988-1989. The films capture a moment in the 
AIDS epidemic at the very end of, and following, the Reagan administration (1981-1989); a 
period characterized by economic and social conservatism during which certain bodies became 
the focus of intense moral scrutiny and scapegoating (see Corber, 2003; Jeffords, 1994). As 
Susan Jeffords has argued,  
The Reagan era was an era of bodies. […] In the dialectic of reasoning that constituted 
the Reagan movement, bodies were deployed in two fundamental categories; the errant 
body containing sexually transmitted disease, immorality, illegal chemicals, ‘laziness,’ 
and endangered fetuses, which we can call the ‘soft body’; and the normative body that 
enveloped strength, labor, determination, loyalty, and courage—the ‘hard body’—the 
body that was to come to stand as the emblem of the Reagan philosophies, politics, and 
economies (p. 24-25). 
Grouped together, certain bodies (often poor women and people of colour) became emblematic 
of national upheaval and instability (Corber, p. 109; Jeffords, p. 25). The emergence of 
HIV/AIDS bolstered this belief (see Christiansen & Hanson, 1996). Gay men, intravenous drug 
users, sex workers, and other sexual and social outsiders were perceived as a threat to national 
interests because of their potential as “AIDS carriers” (Christiansen & Hanson, 1996; Gamson, 
1989). One of the most defining features of the Reagan era during the AIDS epidemic was 
Reagan’s resounding silence; astoundingly, Reagan did not publicly address AIDS until 1987, 
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six years into the epidemic. At the time of his address, upwards of 36,000 Americans had been 
diagnosed with AIDS, and more than 20,000 people had already died (Gamson, p. 359). Reagan 
was heavily criticized for his inaction; most famously, perhaps, by ACT UP—a militant AIDS 
activist group—who coined the controversial phrase “Silence=Death” (see Crimp, 1989; Gould, 
2009). The films/play in my analysis emerge in the wake of this highly divisive political context, 
imbued with a sense of urgency and loss as a result of the massive death toll and remaining 
uncertainty of AIDS.   
Philadelphia, released in 1993, is widely considered one of the first mainstream 
Hollywood films to have HIV/AIDS as its central theme (see Hart, 2000). The film follows the 
story of Andrew Beckett (Tom Hanks), a successful young attorney at the city’s largest corporate 
law firm, who is dismissed following the emergence of a small, dark lesion on his face. Although 
Beckett is not formally out as gay or HIV positive, he suspects that his dismissal is directly 
related to concerns over his sexuality and sexual health. Primarily his suspicions are due to the 
timeline of events in which his dismissal took place: first, Beckett is assigned the firm’s most 
important case and given reason to believe that following a successful outcome, he will be 
named partner. Second, on the day of his assignment one of his employers notices the lesion on 
his forehead. Third, Beckett works from home the next several days in order to avoid suspicion 
or concern at his workplace, where he finishes and submits the complaint for the case he is 
assigned. Beckett then falls ill and is taken to the hospital. Shortly after he learns that the 
complaint has been misplaced and is dismissed from his position the following day. It is clear 
that the file was intentionally misplaced so that it would appear as if Beckett’s dismissal was the 
result of his own incompetence. Beckett subsequently employs personal injury lawyer Joe Miller 
(Denzel Washington) to represent him in a wrongful dismissal case against the firm, in what is 
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presented as one of the first cases of its kind. Philadelphia received wide acclaim, including two 
Academy Awards, and grossing a total of $206,678,440 worldwide.  
Less known are the real events by which the film is inspired (although disputed)—the 
two cases of Geoffrey Bowers, an attorney who sued the law firm Baker & McKenzie for 
wrongful dismissal in 1987, and Clarence B. Cain, an attorney who sued and won the case 
against his former employer Hyatt Legal Services for wrongful dismissal upon discovery of his 
serostatus (see Bergman & Asimow, 2006). In 1987, Geoffrey Bowers filed a complaint with the 
New York State Division of Human Rights alleging discrimination on the basis of his HIV 
status. Like Beckett, Bowers was fired after the appearance of lesions on his face and body. 
Although he died before the end of the trial, Bowers won the case and was awarded one of the 
largest settlements to be granted at that time. Clarence B. Cain was a black lawyer at the 
Philadelphia law firm Hyatt Legal Services. He was fired in 1987 and won his court case in 
1990. The case was one of the first AIDS discrimination cases in history. That same year, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act gave formal protection to those with HIV/AIDS, defining 
HIV/AIDS as a disability due to the physical and social limitations placed on the individual (see 
Gostin & Webber, 2010). 
Angels in America was written initially as a play by Tony Kushner in 1993, the same year 
as Philadelphia, under the name Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes. The 
play, set in 1988, tells the stories of several, interconnected strangers living in New York City: 
Prior (Justin Kirk), a gay man diagnosed with AIDS; Louis (Ben Shenkman), Prior’s ex-
boyfriend who leaves him following his diagnosis; Roy (Al Pacino), based on the life of 
conservative lawyer Roy Cohn who died of complications due to AIDS; Joe (Patrick Wilson), a 
closeted Mormon who works for Roy; Harper (Mary-Louise Parker), Joe’s neurotic Mormon 
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wife; and Belize (Jeffrey Wright), a gay nurse who is Prior’s best friend. The play also features a 
number of “Angels,” who visit several of the main characters throughout the story, all played by 
actors with other roles. The play struggles with the challenges of gay men (and those close to 
them) at the height of the epidemic, including issues such as homophobia, the closet, death and 
loss, romantic and sexual relationships, and the conservative political climate of the time. The 
play garnered praise among critics and received several Tony Awards and a Pulitzer Prize. Ten 
years later, re-released under the shortened name Angels in America, the play was adapted for an 
HBO television miniseries featuring celebrity names such as Meryl Streep and Al Pacino. The 
film received widespread praise including multiple Golden Globe and Emmy awards, among 
many others, as well as being named “Best of the filmed AIDS portrayals” by The Seattle Times. 
The renewed exposure allowed the film/play to reach audiences who wouldn’t have otherwise 
come into contact with it.  
 I have chosen these films for a number of reasons. First, in both films the skin discloses a 
turning point for the protagonist; that is, the appearance of KS marks the beginning of the end, as 
it were, for both characters. I argue that these films dramatize both the individual and the 
collective battle with AIDS on and through the skin: while for the characters, KS indicates the 
seriousness of their illness, it also acts as a repository for cultural fears relating to homosexuality 
and death because of its close association with AIDS. Skin diseases and disfigurements are, as a 
whole, closely associated with contagion. Disturbing the boundary between self and other, 
lesions and other ruptures to the skin’s surface threaten the possibility of contamination from the 
outside (Shildrick, 2001). Entangled as it is with the transmission of HIV, KS is a particularly 
potent signifier in this regard. Second, I consider these films as key parts of an archive of 
HIV/AIDS representations. In foregrounding these specific texts which were written in the early 
8 
 
1990s (approximately 10 years into the epidemic) I intend to do more than contribute to the 
archive of historical HIV/AIDS representations (e.g. to add to Simon Watney and Sunil Gupta’s 
1986 “dossier” on the rhetoric of HIV/AIDS) although this is also important to me. Rather, I 
hope to elucidate some of the ways in which these earlier HIV/AIDS representations suggest that 
the skin functions as a significant cultural site in queer histories. Why should the skin matter to 
queer studies? Like race, is queerness written on the skin? Of course, HIV/AIDS representations 
have transformed over time; scientific developments, AIDS activism, and changing cultural 
anxieties about death, disability, and sexuality all contribute to the wide array of images and 
texts about the disease. I contend, however, that while representations of HIV/AIDS may change 
over time, early depictions remain critically embedded within the cultural construction of the 
disease itself. Put succinctly, early HIV/AIDS depictions—and their repetitive representations of 
KS—have had a tremendous impact on contemporary understandings of the disease. My project 
demonstrates how the skin has been fundamental to this history and, by extension, to modes of 
queer embodiment in the early twenty-first century. In this way I engage with contemporary 
debates relating to what has come to be known as “queer temporality” (see Freeman, 2010; 
Halberstam, 2005). Third, while both films have had enormous mainstream success I am also 
interested in how they might differ. Philadelphia focuses on the story of a “successful” HIV 
positive gay man engaged in a struggle over human rights and social justice precisely because of 
his personal struggle with HIV/AIDS. Personalizing Beckett’s story, the film neutralizes—or at 
least mediates—the politicization of AIDS by both AIDS activists and anti-gay conservatives 
(Corber, 2003). In doing so, Philadelphia engages a “project to nationalize the gay body by 
dequeering it” (Corber, p. 111). On the other hand, Angels in America links the personal to the 
political; offering a reading of HIV/AIDS that undermines the unstated heteronormative 
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trajectory of the cultural politics of everyday life in Reagan’s America. Although Angels in 
America achieved mainstream recognition it remains a queer text insofar as it was adapted from 
a play intended for a queer audience and written by a gay man. Tony Kushner, the original 
author, is also responsible for the screenplay adaptation.  This matters less in terms of its 
“authenticity” as a queer perspective (a concept of which I am deeply skeptical) and more in 
terms of how queer texts may (or may not) be read differently from dominant discourses on 
homosexuality and AIDS. Lastly, I have chosen film representations because they reflect what 
might be called the “visual culture” of AIDS. Indeed, AIDS has been depicted and interpreted 
using a multitude of visible signs such as wasting syndrome and various skin conditions since the 
onset of the epidemic (see Grover, 1989). I employ the concept of vision as a social practice to 
understand how HIV/AIDS representations constitute the disease (see Jenks, 1995). 
I draw connections between queer studies and disability studies. I do so in part because 
within the USA AIDS has been legally defined and protected as a disability (see the Americans 
with Disabilities Act). Both films are set in America spanning the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
period during which AIDS received legal protection, and the law is critical theme each film. 
Because of each film’s attention to the legal context in which their characters live, I find it 
critical to engage with the ways in which AIDS became a matter of law; specifically, as an 
impairment or disability worthy of legal protection. I also draw connections between queer 
studies and disability studies because, like AIDS, disability has itself been constituted through 
spectacle. Critical disability scholars continue to emphasize the ways in which disability is 
threatening insofar as it undermines Western ideals of autonomous selfhood; that is, disabled 
bodies challenge the boundary between self and world through such things as care requirements, 
surgical openings, economic and social dependency on others, and morphological differences 
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(Bost, 2009; Shildrick, 2009; Wendell, 1996). Representations of disability harness these sorts of 
social anxieties in order to reaffirm the integrity of the able-body: amputated limbs, conjoined 
twins, organs that develop outside of the body, and incontinence establish the superiority of able 
bodies by dramatizing the precariousness of disabled boundaries. Further, critical disability 
scholars have argued that the dynamic through which disabled bodies are subject to an able-
bodied gaze has been constitutive of disability itself (Chinn, 2004; Durbach, 2009; Garland-
Thomson, 2002). I argue that if “the history of disability is one of being on display,” as Garland-
Thomson contends, then it is also in many respects a history of the skin (2002, p. 56). As 
Benthien observes “[o]ne of the central themes in a cultural history of the skin is that it is 
continually read and interpreted in all social situations […] Human contact depends unavoidably 
on the skin: it is the manifest place of the other that is accessible to sight and touch” (2002, p. 
11-12; my emphasis). Disabled bodies, like AIDS bodies, are constituted through a 
hypervisibility that is—by its very nature—predicated on the skin. And like various disabilities, 
HIV/AIDS has been characterized as a “disease of boundaries,” absorbing and reflecting cultural 
anxieties over the precarious relationship between self and world and disrupting fantasies of 
bodily integrity (Yang, p. 323). I draw connections, as scholars such as Robert McRuer have 
done, between disability and queer sexualities, in thinking about HIV/AIDS representations as 
skin metaphors. In the case of skin, disability (specifically, disease and disorder) and queer 
sexualities challenge the ways in which “health and ability are naturally linked to [proper] 
heterosexuality” (2006, p. 11). As I argue, such fears are not only expressed through 
preoccupations with the skin and the skin’s failure to protect and contain (i.e. Kaposi’s sarcoma), 
but are also revealed in a cultural obsession over unprotected anal sex among gay men (Bersani, 
1987, p. 212) and other “perverse” boundary crossings, such as intravenous drug use. Boundary 
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transgressions, in which the diseased skin plays a crucial role, form a critical element of social 
anxieties over disability and HIV.  
While HIV/AIDS is well suited to a disability framework, I am also interested in thinking 
critically about the ways in which death and dying have unique implications for the experience 
and cultural significance of illness that are not always befitting that of a disability analysis. 
Disability is not equivalent death, although it may conjure its image. Disability activists and 
scholars have struggled to negotiate the differences and similarities between physical 
impairment/disability and chronic or acute illness (see Wendell, 2001). The mystique 
surrounding HIV/AIDS—its transient status as either, and all at once, a disability, a chronic 
illness, and a potential death sentence—makes this negotiation a more difficult task. “The 
paradox of curability/incurability” which defines it, John Nguyet Erni observes, “is rooted in 
[…] the widespread, if not endemic, perception of AIDS [that] has consistently fluctuated 
between the rhetorics of hope/hopelessness, death/salvation, body/antibody” (1994, p. 70). In 
both Philadelphia and Angels in America death forms a key narrative, the force of which brings 
HIV/AIDS—a presumably strange illness—in closer proximity to the audience: AIDS hits close 
to home. As we might expect, in both films death is significant insofar as it is the pain of a love 
lost. But what else do these films say? How does HIV/AIDS form part of a cultural repertoire of 
deathly imaginings? In some ways, HIV/AIDS is terrifying because it is so associated (real and 
imagined) with larger cultural anxieties over death; that is, the specificities (real and imagined) 
of the AIDS epidemic have had a dramatic impact on the ways in which death and dying are 
articulated and represented, not the least of which has been the impact of such films as 
Philadelphia. Particularly in the earlier part of the epidemic, these deathly narratives were 
dramatized on the skin.  
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Before detailing my methodological approach I want to comment briefly on two 
methodological considerations underlying the scope of my project. First, I have chosen to focus 
my analysis on the relationship of gay men to HIV/AIDS and I should clarify that this is 
reflected in both my object choice and methodology. Of course, HIV/AIDS is no longer (or more 
accurately, never was) an exclusively gay male issue. As the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in 
North America has changed over the last thirty years, the symbolic association of gay men with 
AIDS may be considered by many to be obsolete (see Higgins, Hoffman, & Dworkin, 2010 for a 
discussion of the changing face of HIV/AIDS). In response, scholars and activists working in the 
field have argued that HIV/AIDS has more to do with the social determinants of health than it 
does the sexual identities of those affected/infected (see Malebranche & Bowleg, 2012). 
Additionally, burgeoning preoccupation with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa (among other 
poor regions) has also, to some degree, alleviated cultural associations of homosexuality to AIDS 
in North America. But as we might expect, the transfer of one cultural preoccupation (homo sex) 
to another (the black body) has had complex implications for the ways in which black and 
immigrant bodies are further marginalized, racialized, and excluded from various forms of social 
participation, even as it has “shed light on” the local specificities involved in the epidemic (see 
Marshall, 2005). In the late 1980s HIV prevention strategies began targeting the “general” 
population, the suggestion of which is to argue that HIV affects and infects us all, regardless of 
sexual orientation (Lupton, 1993). Despite these strategies to complicate the association of 
HIV/AIDS with gay men, I believe that the Treichler quote which opens my introduction 
continues to resonate with contemporary readers; sexual deviancy, in one form or another, and 
HIV/AIDS remain reciprocal in their symbolic value. Thus while gays and lesbians are involved 
in the “complex and uneven process of crossing borders” into citizenship, their crossing 
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inevitably “reconstitut[es] the terms and subjects of citizenship as well as the borders 
themselves” (Cossman, 2007, p. 9). For many, the decoupling of HIV/AIDS with homosexuality 
has constituted, in part, the ongoing normalization of certain gays and lesbians on the backs of 
other sexual outsiders: queers of colour, sex workers, drug users, and poor queers continue to be 
marked as deviant, threatening, and risky, as white, middle-class gays and lesbians are 
increasingly recognized for their respectability and likeness to a dominant American culture 
(Cossman, 2007). 
A significant portion of my sources is historical. This is not accidental. I situate 
Philadelphia and Angels in America, as well as much of the earlier theoretical work that I deal 
with, as part of the historical legacy of HIV/AIDS in North America. If “AIDS does not exist 
apart from the practices that conceptualize it, represent it, and respond to it” (Crimp, 1987, p. 3) 
then these historical responses to the epidemic are indeed part of the disease itself. To this end, I 
engage with questions of queer temporality: how do these texts read as part of a queer past? 
What do they reveal about the present? How do we think queerly about time? I argue that 
although the “gay cancer” that first plagued queer communities has lost its metaphorical potency, 
the relevance of these historical texts persists; early representations of AIDS that focus on the 
skin reveal social anxieties related to homosexuality and health that are just as much relevant 
today as they were twenty years ago. This is a methodological question: in addition to what we 
remember about this historical period of the AIDS pandemic, how do we remember it?  Indeed, 
what we remember is informed by how we do so (Castiglia & Reed, 2012). These questions are 
particularly relevant to the history of AIDS because of its potential for forgetfulness; in the most 
basic sense the HIV/AIDS pandemic has threatened the potential for cross-generational forms of 
remembering because so many of those who were alive in the beginning have died.  
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Lastly, I will clarify my terminology. I use the terms “AIDS” and “HIV/AIDS” 
interchangeably to denote the conceptual terrain associated with the chronic condition known as 
AIDS as well as the status of being HIV positive. I do so for two primary reasons. First, both 
Philadelphia and Angels are stories which are primarily about personal struggles and social 
consequences of the protagonists’ medical diagnosis of AIDS; their serostatus, in fact, plays little 
if any role in the films. I attribute this to the context in which each film was written: a time 
earlier in the epidemic when AIDS (the medical condition) was more of an urgent social and 
public health issue that it is today (in the North American context). Medically, a seropositive 
status is used to refer to presence of certain anti-bodies in the bloodstream that indicate HIV 
infection. AIDS, on the other hand, is a diagnosis for which a person tests positive for HIV and 
either: has one of the defining illnesses associated with AIDS (such as candidiasis of the 
esophagus, trachea, bronchi or lungs and Kaposi's sarcoma) or shows a CD4 T cell count of less 
than 200/uL (per microlitre). An AIDS diagnosis is irreversible.  Though HIV and AIDS are 
medically distinct (although related) my use of “AIDS” throughout the text is meant specifically 
to refer to the cultural dimensions of HIV/AIDS. That is, in the context in which HIV/AIDS 
emerged as a social and medical problem, HIV and AIDS were (and continue to be) virtually 
unrecognizable as distinct conditions in the cultural imagination: to be HIV positive is to have 
AIDS, regardless of the medical definitions. This is in large part due to popular misconceptions 
of the virus, as well as cultural fears associating HIV with death. I believe that John Nguyet 
Erni’s 1994 work remains relevant, where he writes,  
Even though in recent years, as a result of increased understanding of the disease, the 
plague model of interpretation has been shifted to the chronic disease model, […] the 
discourse about the horror of AIDS remains dangerously pervasive. New understanding 
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has not shattered the intensive social discussion of the HIV as the impossible obstacle in 
the scientific crusade against the disease, the culprit of horror (p. 40).  
 
Seeing AIDS: 
I begin with the concept of vision as a social practice (in contrast to a “natural” and 
“reliable” sensory reception of the world) as a method of situating visual depictions of AIDS 
within a broader social and political context (Jenks, 1995, p. 2). Underlying this concept are a 
number of suppositions that are vital to my analysis. Primarily, sight is not solely a biological 
function in which the subject perceives, through neurological sensory receptors, that which is 
before it.  Sight (or more accurately, perception) occurs through both the embodied practices and 
discursive context in which subjects and objects are formulated. The concept of sight as a social 
practice considers the relation of vision to truth within the ‘ocularcentric’ Western knowledge 
paradigm. In other words, it is not only that what and how we see is constituted by social as well 
as biological/neurological processes, but that the historical privilege accorded to sight has shaped 
the act of seeing in particular ways (see O’Loughlin, 2006). The relation between vision and 
truth, therefore, is itself formed through power. As Chris Jenks writes,  
the idea of vision and the idea as vision have a history. ‘Idea’ derives from the Greek 
verb meaning ‘to see’. This lexical etymology reminds us that the way that we think 
about the way that we think in Western culture is guided by a visual paradigm. Looking, 
seeing, and knowing have become perilously intertwined (1995, p. 1; original emphasis).  




If, as Jan Grover argued in 1989, AIDS is “a condition that both then and now has been 
partially identified with appearances” this is at least in part because the capacity for knowledge 
of the disease demands its appearance (p. 10). As a result, HIV/AIDS representations constitute 
and reinforce the visuality of the disease while supporting a Western ocularcentric worldview 
that requires AIDS be seen. This “spectacle of AIDS,” defined as the “regime of massively 
overdetermined images associated with HIV/AIDS” in popular culture, science, and government 
policy, has come to constitute the disease itself (Watney, 1987, p. 78). Watney calls attention to 
the ways in which biomedical aspects of HIV/AIDS are constitutive of moralizing texts written 
on the bodies of those with (or presumed to have) the disease: “AIDS is thus embodied as an 
exemplary and admonitory drama, related between the image of the miraculous authority of 
clinical medicine and the faces and bodies of individuals who clearly disclose the stigmata of 
their guilt” (1987, p. 78). Thus, dramatic visual representations, such as the films that form the 
backbone of my project, form part of a chain of signifiers through which HIV/AIDS is 
constituted including biomedical, religious, and other forms of visual representations of the 
disease. Like Watney, I am interested in the ways in which HIV/AIDS texts are at once 
inherently visual and intrinsically linked to the skin—constituting the “spectacle” that stands for 
the disease itself. One of the first visual depictions of AIDS was a series of photographs 
appearing in 1981, in a pamphlet about KS produced by Dr. Marcus Conant, an American 
dermatologist (Grover, 1987, p. 10). Although not widespread, these early photos exemplify 
what was already becoming popular knowledge at the time: that regardless of the biomedical risk 
associated with the lesions (which is considerably low), they are a symbol of impending death.  
Nicholas Nixon’s People with AIDS (Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1988) and 
Rosalind Solomon’s Portraits in the Time of AIDS (Grey Art Gallery, New York 1988) have 
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been substantially critiqued by a number of AIDS scholars including Jan Zita Grover, Douglas 
Crimp, and Roger Hallas. These early AIDS portraits allowed mainstream access into the 
otherwise private deaths of AIDS patients. Paradoxically, in calling public attention to the 
“reality” of AIDS, artistic imagery assisted in constructing its very materiality. As Roger Hallas 
remarks, “[i]n their isolation of the suffering human subject, Nixon’s and Solomon’s 
photographs erased the political and social context to the epidemic [and] perpetuated the 
assurance of visibility to the general public: the contamination of sickness and death could 
remain visibly contained in the vessel of the emaciated, dying body of a person with AIDS” 
(2009, p. 18).  
Philadelphia and Angels rely on certain collective truths, translated visually, about AIDS 
and sexual others, even as they may pose a challenge to them.  Each story depends on a wide 
array of social cues relating to (among other things) the threat of homosexuality to the dominant 
heteronormative culture, the relation of HIV/AIDS to homosexuality, and the collective sense of 
fear occasioned by the epidemic. These social cues shape the meanings (both intended and felt) 
of the characters and events that take place. For instance, how does the portrayal of Andrew 
Beckett’s “wonderfully” supportive, white, and middle class family rely on certain collective 
assumptions about its counterpart—the black, middle class, and homophobic family of his 
lawyer? How might we therefore read Philadelphia “as a cultural artifact that says something 
about certain ways in which white people ‘look’ at black people” (Mercer 435)? Or, to extend 
Mercer’s argument, the way in which straight people “look” and gay people are looked at? And 
how do these films (if indeed they do) unsettle these well-worn orthodoxies of race, sex, and 
gender? In the next section I will outline my phenomenological reading of AIDS representations. 
I argue that the social practice of “seeing AIDS” is embodied insofar as visual depictions of 
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AIDS connect some bodies (through affective recognition), while distancing others (for whom 
certain social cues do not resonate).   
 
A phenomenology of AIDS 
Early phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that “[p]erception, as the pre-
reflective contact of an embodied subject with its world, is necessarily perspectival. I see the 
world from where I am, both literally (from the point in space and time in which I happen to find 
myself) and in a more metaphorical sense (as being a person with a certain sort of body, a certain 
life history, and so on)” (Matthews, 2002, p. 60). Inspired by early phenomenologists’ 
engagement with perception, Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology expands and reworks these 
seminal texts to query their limitations, as well as to bring them into conversation with queer, 
feminist, and anti-racist thought. Ahmed describes her point of entry into phenomenology 
through the concept of perception: 
The radical claim that phenomenology inherits from Franz Bretano’s psychology is that 
consciousness is intentional: it is directed toward something. This claim immediately 
links the question of the object with that of orientation. […] We are turned toward things. 
Such things make an impression upon us. We perceive things insofar as they appear near 
to us, insofar as we share residence with them. Perception hence involves orientation; 
what is perceived depends on where we are located, which gives us a certain take on 
things. […] Perception is way of facing something (2006, p. 27). 
Queer phenomenology is predicated on this concept of orientation, which she describes as both a 
position and a direction (“to be orientated is also to be turned toward certain objects, those that 
help us to find our way” [2006, p. 1]). Orientations direct us in certain ways and, hence, towards 
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certain things: “spatial orientations (relations of proximity and distance) are shaped by other 
social orientations, such as gender and class, that affect ‘what’ comes into view, but also are not 
simply given, as they are effects of the repetition of actions over time” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 23). 
The phenomenological inquiry of perception, such as that of Merleau-Ponty and other more 
traditional scholars, is also oriented towards certain objects and in certain directions. Ahmed’s 
lengthy pursuit of Husserl’s writing table, for instance, reveals that those objects necessary for 
phenomenological writing (the table, the pen, the paper, the computer) come into view at the 
expense of others; if, as according to Husserl, “the social and familiar character of objects [must 
be] ‘bracketed’” (2006, p. 33) in order to perceive the world as phenomenology dictates, “so that 
we can attend to the flow of perception itself” (2006, p. 37), then the social and familiar 
character of objects is lost. And yet, Ahmed continues, “[w]e remain reliant on what we put in 
brackets; indeed, the activity of bracketing may sustain the fantasy that ‘what we put aside’ can 
be transcended in the first place. The act of ‘putting aside’ might also confirm the fantasy of a 
subject who is transcendent, who places himself above the world of social matter […]” (2006, p. 
33). The bracketed familiar character of the writing table, for instance, may reveal the domestic 
setting in which it rests; the gendered labour sustaining Husserl’s capacity to sit, to think, to 
write (Who makes sure he eats? Who cleans his clothes? Who takes care of the children so they 
do not disturb their father?); the women and children who move, eat, and sleep with and around 
the philosopher and his table. The repetitions of actions over time—in this case, the repeated 
bracketing of the familiar in Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry—materialize space and place 
in and on bodies. In the example of Husserl’s writing table, we might argue that the repeated 
bracketing of the domestic, the feminine, materializes the space and place of the philosopher as 
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male, masculine; the body of the philosopher establishes the boundaries of philosophical inquiry 
as a male enterprise. 
My project is phenomenological in two ways: first, I conceive of the embodiment of 
AIDS as integral to the representations which surround and produce it, and second, my analysis 
is motivated by the idea that representations of AIDS (re)define the contours of social space by 
both reproducing and/or challenging normative discourses of belonging. The skin is a critical 
boundary in the production of social space. In her earlier text Strange Encounters, Ahmed asks 
“[t]o what extent do strange encounters involve, not just reading the stranger’s body, but defining 
the contours or boundaries of the body-at-home, through the very gestures that enable a 
withdrawal from the stranger’s co-presence in a given social space?” (2000, p. 38; my 
emphasis). Encounters with the other are generated through movement-in-space; these gestures 
(re)define both the contours of the self/other, as well as the social space inhabited by both self 
and other. As a “border that feels” (2000, p. 45), the skin can both define and expose the 
contours of the body such that some are welcome within a given social space, while others are 
kept out: “The containment of certain bodies in their skin (bodily space) is a mechanism for the 
containment of social space […] The re-forming of bodily and social space involves a process of 
making the skin crawl; the threat posed by strange bodies to bodily and social integrity is 
registered on the skin” (2000, p. 46; original emphasis). 
It seems that to do either Philadelphia or Angels theoretical justice we are best to 
consider the ways in which AIDS representations such as these are so often preoccupied with the 
materiality of suffering. Philadelphia is as much a film about human rights law as it is an 
intimate portrayal of one man’s death. The scene in which Beckett lies in his hospital bed, 
surrounded by family, captures not only the emotional and physical pain of death, but also the 
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emotional and physical relations between people; the cinematic conventions used in Philadelphia 
(such as close face shots) create a phenomenological experience of intimacy for the audience to 
participate in. 
If intimacy is a feeling of closeness between people, then it is only so with an awareness 
of the separation between others. That is, the intimacy we share with certain people (and objects, 
values, places) is only intelligible through the relative distance we experience to others. 
Furthermore, the distance or closeness we share with objects is not accidental; in Ahmed’s words 
“what is ‘present’ or near to us is not casual: we do not acquire our orientations just because we 
find things here or there” (2006, p. 21). Using the concept of inheritance to illustrate the 
underlying heteronormative dimensions of social belonging, she writes, “[...] we also inherit the 
proximity of certain objects […] These objects are not only material: they may be values, capital, 
aspirations, projects, and styles. Insofar as we inherit […] the nearness towards certain objects 
more than others […] we [also] inherit ways of inhabiting and extending into space” (2006, p. 
86). What would it mean to suggest that the films in my analysis direct us in certain ways? Or 
that the ways in which these films direct us are forms of inheritance, moving us closer to some 
objects and away from others? Or more precisely that these films are themselves objects towards 
which we are directed, themselves objects of inheritance? If we think of the AIDS patient as a 
type of stranger—a person away from which we are typically directed—Philadelphia and Angels 
read as objects of inclusion insofar as they (dis)allow opportunities for identification and 
closeness with the affective communities they attract. Philadelphia’s opening scene utilizes the 
audience’s desire for belonging, while setting its boundaries. The camera moves through the city, 
into people’s backyards, parks, shops, and families, all while Bruce Springsteen’s aptly named 
“Philadelphia” plays in the background. The city of Philadelphia is represented as diverse, proud, 
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and historically meaningful to the development of the nation. The audience is at once drawn into 
the city and excluded, assuming we do not live there. 
I argue that a phenomenology of AIDS is structured by intimacies. These intimacies 
include the sexual, emotional, and physical relationships between people, but they are also 
embedded in the discursive constructions of HIV/AIDS. Describing intimacy Lauren Berlant 
writes,  
But intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story 
about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way. […] Yet the 
inwardness of the intimate is met by a corresponding publicness. People consent to trust 
their desire for “a life” to institutions of intimacy (2000, p. 1). 
Intimacy is as much a personal as it is a public experience. HIV transmission is one such form of 
intimacy. The proximity required for the exchange of bodily fluids (penetration, ejaculation, 
tearing, injection, bleeding) encompasses a metaphorical and physical blending of self and other 
that troubles the Western ideal of the “clean and proper body” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 8). When 
“tainted” with illness, this blending defiles the spatio-temporal requirement of autonomous and 
enduring (i.e. healthy) selfhood. We can therefore think of HIV transmission as the “initial” 
transgression, marking the beginning of a whole set of intimacies which structure the 
phenomenology of AIDS. Personal intimacies are translated into public forms of intimacy, 
including a whole range of policies and practices which are intended to keep people with 






The purpose of my project is to illustrate the significance of the skin in defining and 
marking the boundaries of social belonging. Representations of AIDS—specifically those from 
the 1980s and early 1990s—demonstrate a remarkable preoccupation with the surface of the 
body; dark, purple lesions became emblematic of the social and sexual pathology (and in some 
cases, the suffering) of the AIDS patient. Focusing my analysis on two visual representations of 
AIDS from this time period, Philadelphia and Angels in America, I will examine the skin as 
surface upon and from which social difference is inscribed. In Chapter One, “Disability and the 
skin,” I argue that HIV/AIDS—as with other disabilities—disturbs Western notions of bodily 
integrity. Sitting on the skin, Kaposi’s sarcoma became a ready signifier for the failure of the 
AIDS body to maintain the protective boundaries needed to achieve the ideal of the “clean and 
proper body” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 8). While Chapter One examines the idea of the skin as the 
organ which envelopes the self, Chapter Two, “Sexuality and the skin,” extends that idea to 
consider the surfaces which constitute social belonging. Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s concept of 
sexual orientation I explore the ways in which each film constructs the AIDS body as a figure of 
national inclusion/exclusion. In my final chapter, “Death and the skin,” I argue that discourses 
about death are also discourses about social belonging. In their representation of death, each film 
harnesses this relationship; both Philadelphia and Angels are representations of the ways in 
which cultural repertoires of death and dying constitute the contours of belonging—as well as the 






Disability and the Skin 
 
Introduction: Constructing disability 
What is disabling about HIV or AIDS? Given its lengthy history of illness, deterioration, 
and death this might appear to be an easy question. In this chapter I hope to demonstrate why this 
question matters—to highlight some of the complexities of a disability analysis and think 
through why and how it is that HIV/AIDS is considered, by many, to be a disability. While 
researching precedents for his case, Beckett comes across the Supreme Court ruling, made in 
1987, to include people with HIV/AIDS within the definition of disability. Sitting across from 
Miller, the homophobic lawyer who initially rejects Beckett’s request for council, Beckett reads 
from the ruling, 
The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against 
otherwise qualified handicapped persons who are able to perform the duties required by 
their employment. Although the ruling did not address the specific issue of HIV and 
AIDS discrimination, subsequent decisions have held that AIDS is protected as a 
handicap under law, not only because of the physical limitations it imposes, but because 
the prejudice surrounding AIDS exacts a social death which precedes the actual, physical 
one. This is the essence of discrimination: formulating opinions about others not based on 
their individual merits, but rather on their membership in a group with assumed 
characteristics (my emphasis). 
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I highlight this scene to indicate that disability is always, already a contested concept. Not only 
does this ruling re-define HIV/AIDS as a disability, it also adjusts the designation of disability 
itself. According to the Supreme Court AIDS is protected as a disability because of the physical 
deterioration it causes to the patient in addition to the social climate surrounding the disease. 
Disability is re-conceptualized as both a physical limitation as well as a way of living with, and 
being treated by, others; disability, therefore, is as much a matter of the social context in which is 
it lived, as it is an impaired or “abnormal” physical embodiment. Scholars influenced by 
Foucault foreground these social dimensions to illustrate the ways in which disability, as a 
concept, is mutable, productive, and political. I quote disability scholar Shelley Tremain at 
length: 
For the past two centuries […] a vast apparatus, erected to secure the well-being of the 
general population, has caused the contemporary disabled subject to emerge into 
discourse and social existence. Among the items that have comprised this expansive 
apparatus are asylums, income support programs, quality of life assessments, workers’ 
compensation benefits, special education programs, regimes of rehabilitation, parallel 
transit systems, prostheses, home care services, telethons, sheltered workshops, power 
child campaigns, and pre-natal diagnosis. These (and a host of other) practices, 
procedures, and policies have created, classified, managed, and controlled social 
anomalies through which some people have been divided from others and objectivized as 
(for instance) physically impaired, insane, handicapped, mentally ill, retarded, and deaf. 
(2005, p. 5-6). 
Impairment, in this analysis, is not a biological reality but a constellation of discursive and 
institutionalized practices making it appear so. Despite criticism that Foucauldian scholars 
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overvalue discourse at the expense of the materiality of disabled embodiment (i.e. impairment, 
illness, and accessibility), scholarship such as Tremain’s does not, arguably, disallow for the 
physical realities of a non-normative body (see Hughes, 2005). Tremain’s analysis depends on, 
while critiquing, the material; the endless “practices, procedures, and policies” that produce and 
govern the disabled body can exist only in relation to the fleshy, material bodies who make use 
of them and for whom they are meant to “serve”. Epistemological differences aside, my point is 
that the category of disability and the experience of non-normative embodiment are always 
contested and contextual. As the boundaries around who is or is not disabled and what is or is not 
a disability change, so will the materiality of disabled embodiment. Finally, if disability is itself a 
contested and contextual designation, then the question of how and why it is that HIV/AIDS is a 
disability is always a relevant question, despite how self-evident the answer may appear. 
Philadelphia and Angels are largely organized around these “practices, procedures, and 
policies” (and I might add, places). Documenting, and indeed complicating, the productive 
relation of law, biomedicine, and HIV/AIDS, Philadelphia and Angels both centre the physical 
and material demands of HIV/AIDS on the body. If Beckett’s failing health is meaningful to the 
extent that it is a matter of law—to the extent that the social stigma attached to his AIDS status 
impairs his capacity to access and engage in social life—it does so on the surface of his body. 
Beckett’s lesions “matter” inasmuch as they are open to legal discourse, and provide a basis from 
which to determine the validity of Beckett’s case. As each film demonstrates, the skin is a critical 
site from which to theorize disability. Margrit Shildrick has argued that “[i]nsofar as what we 
characterise as disability as opposed to disease is not in itself literally contagious, then it could 
be that the desire to deter the approach of those who are thus labeled […] speaks not to the 
reality of an external threat so much as to a simultaneous apprehension and denial of our own 
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inherent vulnerability” (2001, p. 75). Yet, HIV/AIDS (and other chronic, contagious illnesses) 
takes on the complexities of both; HIV is both a real and an imagined threat, and, as such, is 
critically embedded on the skin. 
 
Disability, boundaries, failure 
Marking the boundary between self and world, and self and other, the skin forms a 
scripted surface upon and from which intersubjectivity is constituted. For critical disability 
scholar Margrit Shildrick, the skin is paramount to the critical analysis of non-normative 
embodiment: 
Accordingly, as the most visible boundary of all, the skin is both the limit of the 
embodied self and the site of potentially transgressive psychic investments. In 
consequence, any compromise of the organic unity and self-completion of the skin may 
signal monstrosity […] What is more notable, however, is that the non-normative 
development of the surface phenomenon can be taken to denote, both in the present day 
and historically, a far more significant disturbance to the structure of being (2001, p. 51). 
Therefore it is not necessarily the disabling (impairment) aspect that is most threatening about 
non-normative skins. Many, many skin disturbances and disorders are not disabling at all. 
Ultimately, then, what skin disturbances make visible is the underlying pathology, a psychic 
disturbance with a much greater destructive force. While each skin disorder carries its own 
historical reading, they are united in their interpretation as a visible sign of social or psychic 
deviancy. Robert Roberts has shown, for instance, the historical development of the herpes virus 
as a source of social crisis; beginning in the late 1960s “the herpetic” emerged as a symbolic 
identity characterized in news media and popular science as socially and sexually deviant, 
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promiscuous, and dangerous (1997, p. 265). Importantly, public outcry over the spread of the 
herpes virus had little, if anything, to do with its medical or physical severity; for instance, 
Roberts cites the panic over “herpes kids”—children with cold sores—in a news report from 
1985; despite the attempt by medical experts to dispel anxieties over the risks imposed by the 
cold sore virus, parents and teachers began advocating for the dismissal and exclusion of 
children known to have the virus that causes cold sores. Roberts identifies these anxieties as co-
incidental and parallel to the moral panic which surrounded the emergence of HIV/AIDS; 
however, Roberts does not examine the pivotal significance of the skin, and of skin disturbances, 
to these sorts of social and moral panics. My argument is that, like herpes, the appearance of KS 
on the bodies of people with AIDS, represents not only the serostatus (biomedical diagnosis) of 
an individual but, more crucially in this case, their underlying sexual deviance. 
In my introductory chapter I make the claim that the phenomenology of AIDS is 
structured by a set of intimacies: that AIDS is both experienced and constituted by the physical, 
social, and emotional relations (proximity) between people. I refer to HIV transmission as the 
“initial” transgression that marks the beginning of a whole set of intimacies and boundary 
crossings that constitute the phenomenology of AIDS. In the case of male-male anal intercourse, 
the male body not only enters the body of another man, but is entered itself. Jean Paul Ricco has 
commented on the transgressive character of male-male anal semen exchange: “It is a question of 
dangerous homologies, or what Jacques Derrida has referred to as a ‘dangerous [read: radical] 
promiscuity,’ being at once a connotatively sexual looseness and a proximity which obliterates 
borders” (1994, p. 58; original bracketing). I am influenced by Julia Kristeva’s “clean and proper 
body” (p. 8)—the body which is whole, unpolluted, and self-controlled—as well as feminist 
disability theorist Shildrick’s work on monstrous embodiment (a concept which is itself highly 
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influenced by Kristeva) as the bodily ideal upon which subjectivity rests. Both Kristeva and 
Shildrick maintain that subjectivity is predicated on the repudiation of that which threatens the 
distinct borders and boundaries necessary to maintain the ideal of the “secure, distinct, closed, 
stable, and autonomous self” (Shildrick, 2001, p. 51). In order to develop and maintain the 
appropriate boundaries of the self, the other is cast out. For Shildrick, disabled embodiment is 
monstrous to the degree that is exposes the vulnerability of the human body, or “the 
vulnerabilities in our own embodied being” (2001, p. 4). This is an important point: the 
vulnerability/failure of the disabled body is not wholly distinct from the normative body; in fact, 
it is threatening because it serves as a reminder of our own precarious functionality1. The normal 
body must therefore be continually upheld in order not to risk its undoing: 
Although the monstrosity of chronic disease or disability overtly undermines any notion 
of a securely embodied subject, that ordinary body is not given, but is always an 
achievement. It requires constant maintenance and/or modification to hold off the ever-
present threat of disruption […]. In short, the normal body is materialised through a set of 
                                                 
1 Robert McRuer’s (2006) analysis of the intersections of heteronormativity and ableism is perhaps 
relevant here. According to McRuer, the governmental practices delineating normative bodily capabilities 
and morphologies are mutually constitutive with heteronormativity; “compulsory able-bodiedness” (a 
term borrowed from Adrienne Rich’s “compulsory heterosexuality”), along with compulsory 
heterosexuality is the institutionalization of a set of assumptions regarding the human body and its 
abilities, appearance, and functionality, whereby able and disabled/heterosexual and homosexual bodies 
are not only produced, but disciplined according to these logics. In terms of disability as failure, McRuer 
extends Judith Butler’s notion of heterosexuality as “performatively constituted through imitation” (qtd. 
p. 9)—where heterosexuality is endlessly in the process of simulating its own ideal, and failing—to 
suggest that both “[a]ble-bodied identity and heterosexual identity are linked in their mutual 
impossibility” (p. 9); each is “an impressive achievement that is always deferred and thus never really 
guaranteed” (p. 9).  I am suggesting that the concurrent and intersecting sexual and physical pathologies 





reiterative practices that speak to the instability of the singular standard (Shildrick, 2001, 
p. 55). 
We might conceive of these reiterative practices as those rituals in and through which we act 
upon the body (i.e. cosmetic surgery, or self-care such as bathing, cutting hair and applying 
makeup) as well as the ritualized discourses which constitute knowledge of, and desire for, 
particular bodily forms (i.e. biomedicine, health education, and literature and film). 
 The concern over disabled bodies is a concern over boundaries. If the ideal self is 
distinct, closed, and autonomous the disabled body is unruly, porous, and affected. Kristeva 
makes a similar point in reference to the female body, and the maternal body more specifically. 
Through things such as menstruation, pregnancy, and breastfeeding, the female/maternal body 
represents both the initial transgression and the initial platform of bodily autonomy: “by 
constructing the maternal figure as an abject being, the symbolic order forces separation of 
mother and infant that is necessary to guarantee its power and legitimacy” (Creed qtd. Shildrick, 
2001, p. 82). The maternal body is abject insofar as it interrupts the normative boundaries of the 
body and autonomous selfhood. Shildrick extends Kristeva’s argument to argue that disabled and 
monstrous bodies also fail to contain or protect themselves in some way. An obvious example of 
this failure is the conjoined twin, who physically shares their body with another person. The 
concept of disabled “failure” may be extended, however, to encompass a whole range of bodily 
morphologies (such as loss of a limb), social relationships (such as financial or physical 
dependency on others), and physical impairments (such as incontinence) that structure the 
experience of disability and that threaten the clean and proper body. By calling the moment of 
HIV transmission the initial transgression which stigmatizes the bodies of those associated with 
the virus, I am suggesting that HIV/AIDS is “monstrous” insofar as it represents, for normative 
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culture, the failure to contain and protect oneself: the ultimate failure of the skin on both literal 
and figurative levels2. Suzanne Yang has called HIV/AIDS a “disease of boundaries” because of 
its ability to remind us so acutely of, not only the volume, but the seriousness, of the invisible 
threats to which we are constantly exposed, therefore revealing our inherent vulnerability (2001, 
p. 323).  
Visual representations of the AIDS body are often characterized by the eruption of the 
inside out. The scene in which Roy Cohn removes his IV and subsequently begins spraying 
blood all over his hospital room is one such instance. The eruption of infected blood creates a 
sense of panic; his illness exceeds the limits of his own body. In Philadelphia Andrew Beckett is 
taken to the hospital after an attack of explosive diarrhea. When recounting the event to Miguel, 
Beckett is distressed by the fact that he “came that close to not making it to the bathroom again” 
and that he “almost lost it [his diarrhea] in front of everyone.”3 One of the central plotlines in 
Angels involves Louis and Prior, a couple dealing with Prior’s AIDS diagnosis. As Prior’s health 
begins to deteriorate, Louis abandons him. Louis’ departure is ultimately a struggle over the 
bodily and psychic boundaries that divide us from the world, and from those around us. Dealing 
                                                 
2 Of course, HIV transmission is difficult, if not impossible, to know when and where it occurred. Yet, the 
uses of the skin to signify this otherwise invisible moment illustrate its significance. For instance, in 1986 
the New York Times published an editorial by influential conservative commentator William F. Buckley 
suggesting that all those found HIV positive be “tattooed on the upper forearm, to warn common needle 
users, and on the buttocks, to prevent the victimization of other homosexuals” (qtd. in Brouwer, 2009, p. 
114). Self-chosen HIV/AIDS tattoos have also been used (among seropositive, barebacking, and bug-
chasing scenes) as cultural signs of belonging and desire, as well as political forms of resistance: 
“HIV/AIDS tattoos follow in a long line of strategies and methods by people with AIDS and AIDS 
activists to make AIDS and people with AIDS more visible. By signifying their infection on the surface 
of the skin, they publicize what would otherwise remain hidden or unknown” (Brouwer, p. 120). 
3 While diarrhea is a common symptom for people living with HIV/AIDS and can be caused by 
gastrointestinal diseases, antibiotics, and other medications the metaphoric value of these types of 




with his guilt, Louis proclaims to his rabbi that he can’t “incorporate sickness into his sense of 
how things are supposed to go. Maybe vomit…and sores and disease really frighten him, maybe 
he isn’t so good with death.” Of course, Louis is talking about death, but he is also talking about 
the failure of a body to withstand the pressures placed on it. This fear has as much to do with 
what comes into the body as what comes out. Faced with Prior’s leaky body (its failure to keep 
the inside in and the outside out), Louis senses the leakiness of the self. Later on in the film, 
Louis and Prior discuss Louis’ decision to leave. Louis tells Prior that that he had to leave (or is 
at least justified in leaving) in order to preserve what he sees as the necessary limits to human 
subjectivity: 
Prior. There are limits. Boundaries. And you have to be reasonable. […] I’ve been giving 
it a lot of thought. Yes, I fucked up, that’s obvious. But maybe you fucked up too. You 
never trusted me, you never gave me a chance to find my footing, not really, you were so 
quick to attack and…I think, maybe just too much of a victim, finally. Passive. 
Dependent (Kushner, p. 216). 
Prior’s dependence on Louis, then, threatens the boundaries between them—a risk which Louis 
is unwilling to take. In order to preserve his sense of self as secure, healthy, and impenetrable 
Louis must repudiate his lover.  
As others have suggested, the health risks and anxieties associated with HIV/AIDS form 
only part of the discursive construction of the disease. HIV/AIDS is “risky” insofar as it is 
illustrative of the cultural risks it seems to embody: contagious sexual others, social and sexual 
deviants, and non-normative bodies. If AIDS is disabling to the degree that it affects a person’s 
access to social life (see Americans with Disabilities Act 1990), the method by which someone is 
infected becomes justificatory of the disablement with which one experiences the virus. HIV 
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transmission (which primarily involves penetration, ejaculation, tearing of the skin/vaginal or 
anal walls, injection, and/or bleeding) encompasses a metaphorical and physical intimacy that 
troubles Western ideals regarding the autonomous and insular self (Ricco, 1994). Not only does 
HIV transmission require the proximity of those without HIV to those with it (the virus leaving 
one body and entering the other), the cultural meanings given to HIV transmission structure the 
phenomenology of AIDS such that AIDS itself, as with disablement, is a matter of boundaries.  
According to Roy Cohn, if AIDS is a syndrome that usually afflicts homosexuals and 
drug addicts then Roy Cohn does not have AIDS; he concludes that he has liver cancer. He says,  
AIDS. Homosexual. Gay. Lesbian. You think these are names that tell you who someone 
sleeps with, but they don’t tell you that. … Like all labels they tell you one thing and one 
thing only: where does an individual so identified fit in the food chain, in the pecking 
order? Not an ideology, or sexual taste, but something much simpler: clout. Not who I 
fuck or who fucks me, but who will pick up the phone when I call, who owes me favors. 
… Homosexuals are not men who sleep with other men…. Homosexuals are men who 
know nobody and who nobody knows. Who have zero clout (Kushner, p. 51).  
While it may be true that Cohn is ill, he cannot have AIDS because he is not a homosexual; Roy 
Cohn is a very powerful man with very powerful connections, whereas homosexuals are isolated 
and powerless. If, as Cohn argues, AIDS afflicts homosexuals and drug addicts, and if 
homosexuals are isolated and powerless, then the moment in which Cohn acted as a homosexual 
is not necessarily the moment in which he had sex with another man, but the moment in which 
he contracted HIV (although they are most likely the same moment). Here Cohn suggests 
another way of reading HIV transmission that is less about the acts involved (men fucking other 
men), than it is about the proximity of those involved to those with power, and to society as a 
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whole. Put simply, AIDS happens to those we do not know and in places which are 
“uninhabitable by normative subjects.  
 
Boundary crossings and freedom 
Louis, while having anonymous sex with a man in Central Park, begs to be infected in 
order to pay for his “sin” of abandonment. Louis hopes that the social and physical consequences 
of infection will serve as retribution for his moral failings. In a later scene he submits to physical 
assault in order to prove to Prior that he has paid for his misdeeds. The bruises visible on his skin 
read as punishment for his sins. For Prior, on the other hand, HIV/AIDS is the prophetic cross he 
bears; Prior bears the burden of the disease as he bears the burden of humanity’s failures. There 
is a subtle and yet profound distinction between these examples of HIV/AIDS as retribution or 
burden—a discrepancy which Kushner explores throughout the film. For Louis HIV/AIDS 
serves as punishment for moral transgression; HIV/AIDS is read, therefore, as sort of prison 
sentence or death sentence, incapacitating the wrongdoer in much the same way that the justice 
system punishes legal transgressions. Kushner complicates this reading (which, we might argue, 
is the more dominant of the two) by casting HIV/AIDS as prophetic; that is, as something 
imbued with purpose, responsibility, and promise. Though “burdened” by HIV/AIDS, Prior as 
Prophet is not incapacitated by his illness, but given the responsibility and will to act on the 
behalf of humankind. 
While Philadelphia may challenge the idea that those with AIDS are deserving of 
marginalization and poor treatment, it does not go so far as to suggest that people living with 
HIV/AIDS lead rich and fulfilling lives. After all, Beckett’s case hinges on the legal definition 
whereby HIV/AIDS falls under the definition of disability insofar as those infected experience a 
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social death which is akin to the physical one. Although Beckett’s family is portrayed as 
supportive and loving, there is an underlying tragedy palpable in their interactions. In his public 
life Beckett is fired from his job, faces discrimination by his lawyer and the general public, and 
is increasingly and painfully ill. The idea of disability as punishment or penance has a long 
history. Disabled bodies have been associated with sin and evil for centuries—whether as 
punishment for an individuals’ transgression or to serve as a reminder of the general corruption 
of humankind (Shildrick, 2001, p. 17). But what if disability were seen as beneficial, even 
liberating? Take this striking scene in Angels, in which Louis and Joe go for a walk on the beach:  
LOUIS (referring to Joe’s Mormon undergarments). So the fruity underwear you wear,  
      that’s…  
JOE. A temple garment. 
LOUIS. Oh my God. What’s it for? 
JOE. Protection. A second skin. I can stop wearing it if you… 
LOUIS. How can you stop wearing it if it’s a skin? Your past, your beliefs, your… 
JOE. I can give up anything. My skin. (Joe removes his clothes and undergarments) I’m  
     flayed. No past now. I could give up anything. Maybe…in what we’ve been doing,       
     maybe I’m even infected… (Kushner, p. 203-206) 
Joe’s second skin (his past, his beliefs, his identity) is protective insofar as it keeps those things 
considered threatening to the Mormon religion out (sin, evil, homosexuality). In removing his 
undergarments, Joe opens himself up to Louis and subsequently to those things from which he 
was previously protected. Where Joe finds the promise of freedom in his relationship with Louis, 
he also finds the possibility of infection; and yet, this makes him desire Louis all the more. What 
does it mean to associate HIV, AIDS, disability, or illness with freedom? In this scene, a 
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possibility is created in which vulnerability can be a pathway to strength; infection is imbued 
with power whereas previously it was only for the powerless. In this way Angels complicates the 
association of disability with imprisonment, burden, or social death, as well as it complicates the 
meanings associated with the boundaries of the body.  
 Joe’s (potential) moment of HIV infection is characterized by passion, freedom, and love. 
In doing so, Joe opens up new spaces for thinking about “health”, and for undermining the 
assumption that we all share a definition of what health is—in particular that health is invariably 
more desirable than un-health. In some sense Joe refuses to give us the answer we are looking 
for, in which “[a] system of compulsory able-bodiedness repeatedly demands that people with 
disabilities embody for others an affirmative answer to the unspoken question, ‘Yes, but in the 
end, wouldn’t you rather be more like me?’” (McRuer, 2006, p. 9). Johnathan Metzl has spoken 
of the moral imperative of health in contemporary society, a discourse in which “appealing to 
health allows for a set of moral assumptions to fly stealthily under the radar” (2010, p. 2). 
Appealing to health also constructs those moral assumptions upon which it insidiously rests; 
moral assumptions such as health is socially responsible, self-care demonstrates self-respect, or 
a healthy body is equivalent to a health mind. Of course, this means that those who are 
“unhealthy” are socially irresponsible, morally culpable, mentally unstable, and so on. Health, 
Metzl argues, is therefore not only “a desired state, but it is also a prescribed state and an 
ideological position” (p. 2).   
 
 
Conclusion   
In order to better understand, to better inhabit a world with the monster Shildrick 
concludes that “[o]nce the surface of our bodies is understood not as a protective envelope that 
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defines and unifies our limits but as an organ of physical and psychical interchange, then the 
(monstrous) other is always there, ‘like my skin’” (2001, p. 119). By deconstructing the 
boundaries of the body, Shildrick discovers that they were never there to begin with: in fact, the 
other and the self are one in the same. But more critically, the “disabled” body is a fiction, 
constituted through discursive repetition. Shildrick intervenes in this repetition to argue that 
perhaps we are all always, already disabled, just as we are all able-bodied. 
Several scholars including Sara Ahmed and Robert McRuer have critiqued this sort of 
“other within” argument put forth by Shildrick. McRuer argues that, in fact, these sorts of 
arguments maintain, rather than deconstruct, the processes of exclusion constituting disablement. 
If, for instance, Louis comes to the conclusion that, indeed, the boundary separating himself from 
Prior is a fiction—that Louis has AIDS as much as Prior by his mere proximity to him, or his 
identification as a gay man in the 1980s, or simply because he has a body that is intersubjective 
rather than distinct—what does this conclusion do for Prior, or for those others living and dying 
with the disease? And how might we then account for the ways in which Louis is implicated in 
Prior’s social and physical disablement, such as his romantic entanglement with (and by 
extension ambivalence towards) the ultra-Conservative Right? If Louis is basically Prior but for 
(allowing for) the physical separation of their two bodies, to what does he owe Prior as the more 
privileged of the two?  Not only does the “other within” limit the political engagement of people 
with disabilities, it may also further “contain” disabled people as marginal figures. Ahmed 
contends, therefore, that “[t]he journey towards the stranger becomes a form of self-discovery, in 
which the stranger functions yet again to establish and define the ‘I’” (2000, p. 6). The problem 
here is that this journey of self-discovery (“I am a stranger, we are all strangers” [2000, p. 6]) 
conceals “the political processes whereby some others are designated as stranger than other 
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others” (2000, p. 6; original emphasis). Although Ahmed maintains that identity is constituted 
through repudiation, “to conclude simply that we are all strangers to ourselves” (2000, p. 6) 
misses the point: not all others are others equally. 
To conclude, disability is threatening insofar as it signifies an unraveling of the self: 
disabled bodies, ill bodies, disrupt cultural fantasies of the “clean and proper body,” a self which 
is contained, autonomous, and capable. While on the one hand these fantasies speak to the 
unattainable nature of such a self (we are all vulnerable in some way, we will all fall ill, we will 
all die), they also serve to privilege some bodily forms over others. The white, masculine, 
heterosexual body is a body which, however vulnerable, represents the most desirable, most 
normal self. If disability embodies the inability to keep others out, or to contain the self, the skin 
provides an exceptional platform for the performance of these anxieties. The skin is, ultimately, 
the surface upon which identity is carved out, the boundaries of the body are secured, and the 
self is protected. Failure to achieve the proper bodily form, whether through illness, congenital 
defect, or amputation is always a matter bound up with skin; and HIV/AIDS is no exception. As 
the initial transgression (viral penetration of the body’s surface) HIV transmission is a potent 
cultural signifier for what is ultimately “wrong” (terrifying) about HIV/AIDS. And yet, in some 
ways, Philadelphia and Angels each tell a similar story: for both Andrew Beckett and Roy Cohn 
social capital (as white, wealthy men) acts as protective barrier against what would otherwise 
certainly end in social death. With the law on his side, Beckett overcomes his relative “guilt” 
associated with infection. Similarly Cohn is able to escape (or delay) the social consequences of 
infection because of his social and political membership and his mastery of the law. In either 
case, the meanings associated with the act of seroconversion (vulnerability, femininity, 







Sexuality and the Skin 
Introduction 
Nothing has made gay men more visible than AIDS. […] While apprehensiveness about 
HIV led thousands of gay men to become habitués of health clubs, the ‘gym body of gay 
male culture’ can no longer be merely admired in the club’s floor-to-ceiling mirrors; now 
every blemish is scrutinized for fearsome resemblance to molluscum contagiosum or, 
worse, KS […] Thanks largely to television and movies, the entire country has been able 
to take in (while of course distance itself from) the images of our wasted bodies. The 
normal fear of homosexuality has been promoted to a compelling terror as a secret 
fantasy becomes public spectacle: the spectacle of men dying from […] the suicidal 
ecstasy of taking their sex like a woman (Bersani, Homos 19; original emphasis). 
 
AIDS, perhaps more so than any other illness, has been constituted through spectacle. 
Early depictions of AIDS rely heavily on the skin, and particularly on KS, to communicate—
biomedically, rhetorically, metaphorically—the veracity of the disease for the individuals 
suffering as well the social impact. As Simon Watney declared, “AIDS is thus embodied as an 
exemplary and admonitory drama, related between the image of the miraculous authority of 
clinical medicine and the faces and bodies of individuals who clearly disclose the stigmata of 
their guilt” (1987, p. 78; my emphasis). The intersubjectivity of the skin (containing the self, 
requiring a “not self”) inherent in AIDS representations has remarkable consequences for the 
social meanings of the disease. And yet, as I argued in my introduction, KS and AIDS are not 
merely written on, or taken from, the surface of the AIDS body (also, the gay body); each is 
sutured to the other such that queer bodies are “skinned” in particular ways, symbolically 
chained to the historical impact of AIDS. 
In the previous chapter I argued that the skin serves as a both a metaphor and a platform 
for cultural anxieties relating to bodily and subjective failure. That is, the skin is a protective and 
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yet porous boundary between the self and world. Subjectivity is formed through this very 
paradox; the skin both materializes the subject as a distinct entity and constitutes its 
intersubjectivity, opening the subject up to a world with others. Revealing the precariousness of 
the body’s boundaries, disability, non-normative morphologies, and illness trouble the 
individual’s and collective sense of self.  In this chapter I extend this conception of the skin from 
the organ which envelopes the self, to the surfaces which constitute social belonging. Several 
skin studies scholars have elaborated the relation between body surfaces, mapping, and 
national/social belonging. For instance Emily Grabham’s observation of the media coverage of 
war veterans in the UK and US shows that “just as the nation is imagined and produced through 
everyday rhetoric and maps and flags, it is also constructed on the skin, and through bodies, by 
different types of corporeal ‘flagging’” (2009, p. 64). I argue that this is also true for other forms 
of belonging. Thus, while (and even because) KS is a potent signifier of the failing AIDS body, 
so too is it an emblem of the limits of social belonging. 
Sex brings people together; it is an intimate act. For the purposes of my analysis I 
consider the concept of intimacy to include not only the physical and emotional closeness of 
familial, sexual, and romantic relationships, but also the socio-political arrangements of public 
life. I do so with the intention of integrating the bodily, lived experience of AIDS with the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion that also constitute the disease. As I argued in my 
introductory chapter, in order to do either Philadelphia or Angels theoretical justice we are best 
to consider the ways in which AIDS representations such as these are so often preoccupied with 
the materiality of suffering. And yet, if the materiality of AIDS is, as I have argued, an account 
of the intimacies between people (including relationships of care, love, pain, and sex) then it is 
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also an account of the larger processes by which find certain bodies more intimate than others. 
As Ahmed suggests: 
[n]ot all bodies are within reach. Touch also involves an economy: a differentiation 
between those who can and cannot be reached. Touch then opens bodies to some bodies 
and not others. Queer orientations are those that put within reach bodies that have been 
made unreachable but the lines of conventional genealogy (2006, p. 107). 
Sexual touch as well opens the subject up to “some bodies and not others,” in both spatial and 
socio-political terms. As scholars working in the areas of queer geography and sexual citizenship 
studies have shown us, sexuality shapes the contours of social belonging, constituting citizenship 
through a set of technologies aimed at (among other things) reproductive, sexual, and familial 
life.  
To paraphrase Ahmed, sexual citizenship is an orientation, the effect of which draws 
some bodies nearer while distancing others; in turn, “‘proximity’ and ‘distance’ come to be lived 
by being associated with specific bodies as well as places” (2006, p. 112). To describe certain 
bodies as “strange” is at the same time to say that they are “distant”.  HIV/AIDS is associated 
with particular bodies and places which threaten (and yet, materialize) the boundaries of sexual 
belonging/conventions. Here we might compare Ahmed’s concept of proximity to Shildrick’s 
use of the abject: each is an account of the processes by which certain bodies are made “strange” 
(distant/abject) through their incapacity to meet the demands required of the normative. As the 
disabled body is not simply constituted through its relation to the able body but the conceptual 
“sameness” of able bodies to one another, so is sexual citizenship predicated on the likeness of 
heterosexuality. In other words, it is not only the relative proximity of sexual others that 
constitutes their exclusion; sexual citizenship is also materialized through the directions, the 
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orientations, we are moved in and move ourselves. As my close reading of Ahmed’s queer 
phenomenological theory will show, the concept of belonging is more than a space or location, it 
may also be conceived of as the directions in which we move or the life we live that directs us 
here or there. Sexual membership—dependent on the paths we follow—validates who we are as 
much as the way we live. This in turn draws some bodies into closer proximity than others.  
Although queer, or more specifically, gay male sexuality is positioned at the centre of my 
critique because of its historical attachment to AIDS and its centrality within both films, I prefer 
to complicate the “hetero/homo axis” which has traditionally dominated the literature on sexual 
citizenship (Cossman, 2007, p. 9). Where scholars such as Shane Phelan argue that because 
“heterosexuality is a prerequisite for modern citizenship” (2010, p. 5) lesbians, gays, and 
bisexual people are therefore “strangers” within the United States (and presumably other nation-
states as well), I problematize the notion of the gay stranger, as well as the hetero/homo divide 
which supposedly constitutes membership. As Cossman argues, not only have gay and lesbian 
subjects begun to acquire access to citizenship, the “focus on the hetero/homo axis of citizenship 
neglects the multiple ways in which the hetero side of the equation is subject to extensive 
regulation” (p. 9), not to mention the multiple axes which shape citizenship as a whole (i.e. race, 
class, location). Thus while gays and lesbians are involved in the “complex and uneven process 
of crossing borders” into citizenship, their crossing inevitably “reconstitut[es] the terms and 
subjects of citizenship as well as the borders themselves” (Cossman, p. 9). As I complicate the 
hetero/homo axis which has traditionally dominated queer sexual citizenship literature, I do so 
with the intention of understanding how it is that homosexuality plays a central, and yet 
cooperative, role at the intersection of HIV/AIDS and sexual belonging.  
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In what direction and to which places does a life in proximity to AIDS (and its associated 
sexual transgressions) lead us? In essence, what is it that makes a life with HIV/AIDS a life not 
worth living? Incorporating a phenomenological with a critical citizenship reading, Philadelphia 
and Angels may be read as objects of belonging. Each film carries with it a collection of material 
and symbolic “inheritances” that come to us by way of their consumption. In other words, I read 
Philadelphia and Angels as objects towards or away from which we may be directed, given our 
relation to the contours of sexual belonging. I also read them each as directions in themselves; 
that is, each film is instructive insofar as it says something about how to live with one another, 
each film orients the audience towards or away from certain bodies. The orientations passed on 
to us through each film connect race, class, disability, and sex in complex ways. I argue that 
while Philadelphia is oriented towards a more traditional understanding of the politics of sexual 
citizenship, Angels is disorienting insofar as it poses a challenge to heteronormative aspirations 
of sexual belonging. 
 
Queer Phenomenology  
 Towards the latter half of the 1990s there began a proliferation of academic writing 
which recognized the importance of “spatial and temporal context and fluidity” (Browne, Lim, & 
Brown, 2009, p. 2). Though diverse, “the central theme of this explosion of work has been the 
exploration of the relationship between sexualities, space and place” (Browne et al, p. 2). By 
asking how it is that spaces and places are sexualized and exploring the ways in which sexuality 
is embedded in geography, this body of work has “queered” normative perceptions of space 
which lack a comprehensive understanding of the political processes by which space and place 
are produced, lived, and transformed. Clearly influenced by these writings Ahmed is interested in 
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a reading of space which attends to its bodily, relational, and political dimensions. In doing so, 
Ahmed turns to phenomenology.  
Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology, published in 2006, is in many ways, an extension 
of her previous work and a key component in her robust theoretical trajectory. Broadly, Ahmed’s 
critical theory is concerned with the effects of political and social arrangements on the body, and 
vice-versa. More specifically Ahmed takes interest in the relations of bodies, produced by and 
constitutive of these arrangements. Her work integrates the affective, spatial, and bodily 
components of belonging, and the ways in which we are variously “marked” by our positionality 
and relation to others. In so doing, Ahmed takes great interest in the skin. Paradoxically, she 
discovers, while the skin serves to contain the self within the appropriate bodily boundaries, it 
cannot do so without simultaneously opening the body to other bodies (2000, p. 45). The forming 
of bodily and social space is the effect of such openings, at the same time as it shapes and 
impresses upon the bodies which inhabit it.  For Ahmed, this paradox is not a metaphor: while 
the skin, quite literally, shapes the contours of the body-in-space, it does not itself go unmarked: 
“the containment of certain bodies in their skin (bodily space) is a mechanism for the 
containment of social space” with some bodies included within its contours to the exclusion of 
others.  
Queer Phenomenology develops these sorts of phenomenological underpinnings that span 
her work, as well as rethinks the relation of sexuality and space. Ahmed’s project in the book is 
twofold: 1) to “queer” traditional phenomenology by considering its limitations: Ahmed’s use of 
the “politics of location” (2006, p. 5) reveals how phenomenology might presume and 
universalize a particular body, and therefore a particular (and privileged) way of being in the 
world; and 2) to “mov[e] queer theory toward phenomenology” to show not only “how bodies 
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are gendered, sexualized, and raced [but] how they extend into space […] becom[ing] orientated 
by how they take up time and space” (2006, p. 5). Phenomenology is therefore both her object of 
inquiry and her methodological impetus.  Ahmed describes her point of entry into 
phenomenology through the concept of perception: 
The radical claim that phenomenology inherits from Franz Bretano’s psychology is that 
consciousness is intentional: it is directed toward something. This claim immediately 
links the question of the object with that of orientation. […] We are turned toward things. 
Such things make an impression upon us. We perceive things insofar as they appear near 
to us, insofar as we share residence with them. Perception hence involves orientation; 
what is perceived depends on where we are located, which gives us a certain take on 
things. […] Perception is way of facing something (2006, p. 27). 
Queer Phenomenology is predicated on this concept of orientation, which she describes as both a 
position and a direction (“to be orientated is also to be turned toward certain objects, those that 
help us to find our way” [2006, p. 1]). Orientations direct us in certain ways and, hence, towards 
certain things. She argues, “spatial orientations (relations of proximity and distance) are shaped 
by other social orientations, such as gender and class, that affect ‘what’ comes into view, but also 
are not simply given, as they are effects of the repetition of actions over time” (2006, p. 23). 
Through these repetitions space and place are materialized in and on bodies. In her chapter “The 
Orient and other others” Ahmed describes this process in racial terms:  
The alignment of race and space is crucial to how they materialize as givens, as if each 
‘extends’ the other. In other words, while ‘the other side of the world’ is associated with 
‘racial otherness,’ racial others become associated with the ‘other side of the world.’ 
They come to embody distance. This embodiment of distance is what makes whiteness 
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‘proximate,’ as the ‘starting point’ for orientation. Whiteness becomes what is ‘here’ 
(2006, p. 121; original emphasis). 
Sexual others embody distance as well; sexual otherness is produced through its alignment with 
particular places (both imposed and chosen) such as the Village, the bathhouse, and the prison. 
Although not on “the other side of the world,” these places appear nevertheless “distant” from 
heterosexual spaces of belonging. Heteronormative cultural practices (from relatively banal 
public displays of affection to more institutional forms such as marriage) materialize 
heterosexual space as everywhere and nowhere (see Berlant & Warner, 1998), while marking 
queer and sexually deviant spaces through their inability to reiterate the demands of sexual 
belonging. Queers and other sexual others come to embody distance through their alignment with 
distant places—places which appear unintelligible to heteronormative culture (see Bell & 
Valentine, 1995). In turn, heterosexuality marks the “‘starting point’ for orientation” in much the 
same way as whiteness (Ahmed 2006, p. 121).  
 In her introduction Ahmed contends that, “queer phenomenology might offer an approach 
to sexual orientation by rethinking the place of the object in sexual desire; by attending to how 
the bodily direction ‘toward’ such objects affects how bodies inhabit spaces and how spaces 
inhabit bodies” (2006, p. 23). For Ahmed, sexual orientation does not only describe who one has 
sex with, but also (and perhaps more importantly) the ways in which desire moves us. Ahmed’s 
queer phenomenology, therefore, considers the ways in which bodies are compelled towards (or 
away from) objects of desire, and the effects of these movements. Taking cues from Adrienne 
Rich, Ahmed conceives of heterosexuality as a “compulsory orientation” (2006, p. 71) such that 
“the normalization of heterosexuality as an orientation toward ‘the other sex’ can be redescribed 
in terms of the requirement to follow a straight line whereby straightness gets attached to other 
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values including decent, conventional, direct, and honest” (2006, p. 70; my emphasis). These 
“attachments” also bring bodies together; following the straight line ensures membership within 
dominant heterosexual culture, as it brings those who share our orientation within view. 
Correspondingly, queer sexualities are made distant through their inability to follow what is 
expected of them.  
Although informed by Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, Ahmed’s contemporary, 
critical phenomenology is also a departure from this seminal work as it is firmly rooted in queer, 
feminist, and critical race theory. If “phenomenology is often characterized as a ‘turn toward’ 
objects” (2006, p. 25), Ahmed takes interest in how phenomenology itself “faces a certain 
direction” (2006, p. 27), bringing certain objects into view, while obscuring others. “Attention,” 
she observes, “involves a political economy” (2006, p. 32); although phenomenology as a whole 
has allowed for the process of perception as an object of critical analysis, the discipline is not 
without its own limitations, blind spots, and specific orientations. My project is fundamentally 
shaped by Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology, in this regard. Less “‘properly’ phenomenological” 
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 2) my interest in the phenomenology of AIDS is to think through how it is that 
sexual orientations construct the AIDS body as “strange”. To this end, I examine Philadelphia 
and Angels as both objects towards or away from which subjects are directed, as well as 
directives in themselves.   
 As each film harnesses deeply embedded cultural fantasies associated with the skin, they 
capture the importance of the body’s surface as a symbol of belonging and exclusion. And yet 
the directions in which each film moves us diverge quite significantly. I begin by focusing on 
Philadelphia. I argue that although Philadelphia illuminates the importance of the skin as a 
symbol of sexual belonging, it fails to elaborate the intersections of race and sexuality in a 
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meaningful way. As a result, the film reproduces dominant discourses which materialize white 
heterosexuality as a “compulsory orientation” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 71).  
 
Race, sexuality, proximity 
Philadelphia 
As a film which is as much about social and national belonging as it is about AIDS, 
Philadelphia hinges on the relationship between skin and sociality as its central narrative. The  
impetus to keep his HIV status—made visible by KS lesions—from his colleagues, was not 
Beckett’s fear of death, but a homophobic work environment in which to be HIV-positive is 
equated with being gay, neither of which are desirable. And as we come to see, Beckett’s bosses 
are not only discomfited by homosexuality, they are viscerally disgusted by the suggestion of sex 
between two men. By marking the bodies of those with AIDS, KS is drawn into the symbolic 
relation of AIDS with homosexuality, anal sex, and sexual perversion. KS, therefore, becomes 
revolting in itself, as the infamous scene in which Beckett displays his lesions to the court 
demonstrates. The dark, purple lesions covering Beckett’s torso, contrasted with his pale and 
sickly skin, appear as if they are AIDS themselves—the deadly virus ravishing Beckett’s body—
rather than a relatively innocuous symptom of a much more complex condition. Paradoxically, 
the revulsion caused by Beckett’s body works in his favour to suggest that had his bosses seen 
such lesions, they would have certainly fired him; in the context of the symbolic slippage 
between KS, AIDS, and homosexuality, Beckett’s removal would be a logical, and justifiable, 
action. 
But if anyone is so repulsed by Beckett’s body it is Joe Miller, his lawyer—so much so 
that Miller initially rejects Beckett’s request for council. Throughout the film Miller struggles 
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with the internal conflict he experiences representing Beckett. In one scene, approached by a 
young gay man in a pharmacy who has been following the case, Miller violently erupts, 
threatening that he should “kick [the young man’s] faggoty little ass” for assuming he was gay, 
and claiming that “this is exactly the kind of bullshit that makes people hate you guys [gay 
men]”. In an earlier scene he responds to the goading of a man at a bar, that “those people [gays] 
make me sick!” The very mention of homosexuality often provokes a deep anger and repulsion 
in Miller throughout the film, even as he remains Beckett’s lawyer. What is interesting is that 
Miller’s disgust is often provoked by the suggestion that he is the same as Beckett, because of his 
very proximity to him—as if homosexuality is acquired through simply being in touch with gay 
men and/or people with AIDS. In conversation with his wife, Lisa, Miller asks rhetorically if she 
would represent someone with whom simply sharing space is frightening, “I hope this guy 
doesn’t touch me. I hope he doesn’t even breathe on me”. The symbolic slippage between KS, 
AIDS, and the gay body is threefold: 1) KS is on Beckett, as a stain which marks his AIDS 
status; 2) KS is in him, KS is HIV/AIDS by its very association; 3) Andrew Beckett is therefore 
a virus himself; the gay body is a virus insofar as it is proximate to AIDS, in a biomedical as well 
as social sense. 
Undoubtedly, Miller’s feeling of contagion is shaped by the heteronormative and 
homophobic context of which he is a part; throughout the twentieth century homosexuality has 
been perceived as a threat to national security, and by extension the heterosexual (see 
Richardson, 1998). And yet at the heart of Miller’s panic is also an awareness that, in a very 
basic sense, we are always touched by the people who touch us. As Ahmed contends, 
Bodies as well as objects take shape through being orientated toward each other, as an 
orientation that may be experienced as the co-habitation or sharing of space. Bodies are 
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hence shaped by contact with objects and with others, with ‘what’ is near enough to be 
reached. Bodies may even take shape through such contact, or take the shape of that 
contact. What gets near is both by shaped by what bodies do, which in turn affects what 
bodies can do (2006, p. 54). 
In the above quote Ahmed is distinguishing two dimensions of intersubjectivity: the proximity 
and space shared between bodies, and the directions or orientations in which bodies move. 
Miller’s relationship to Beckett not only brings him in closer proximity to Beckett’s body, but 
reorients him in Beckett’s direction: towards a queer life, and a life with AIDS. By advocating on 
his behalf, the law provides the means by which Miller shapes the direction of Beckett’s life (and 
presumably the lives of those like him), touching him both symbolically and materially. The 
disgust felt by heteronormative culture towards homosexuality is not only a feeling about sex, 
but a fear of the direction in which homosexuality takes us. Take Miller’s statement to his wife, 
while discussing why he dislikes gay men, “And the way they work out, pumping up, so they can 
be macho and faggot at the same time... I can't stand that shit. Now I'm being totally honest with 
you.” In this case, according to Miller, a homosexual life leads one to the gym, in the scene of 
which one becomes part of a culture (even a celebration) of non-normative and subversive 
gender expressions. Homosexuality is threatening to Miller insofar as it challenges “the 
requirement to follow a straight line, whereby straightness gets attached to other values including 
decent, conventional, direct, and honest” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 70). Blurring the boundaries between 
male and female, femininity and masculinity, and hetero/homosexual, being “macho and faggot 
at the same time” is a rejection of such values.  
 In another instance, Beckett is accused of lying because he chose to keep his sexual 
orientation and his AIDS status to himself. Rather than critique the homophobic context in which 
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Beckett lives, it is the closet itself which is the problem; homosexuality is attached to a lifestyle 
which values dishonesty, deception, and secrecy. The further attachment of gay men to such 
things as AIDS, sexual depravity, and pathological pleasure-seeking constitutes the notion that a 
queer life is not a viable life at all; as Kane Race argues, gay men are quite literally, in the 
heteronormative imagination, “partying themselves to death” (2009, p. 138). These suggestions 
in the film can be interpreted, therefore, to represent cultural fears about the ways in which 
contact with queer bodies throws one out of alignment with the heteronormative (read: valuable) 
life.  
 If Philadelphia intends to challenge these sorts of misconceptions about gay men and the 
AIDS body as revolting, unwelcome, or undesirable, on what grounds does the film invite us, the 
audience, to “come together”? How is Philadelphia a directive in itself? Let us review the story: 
Andrew Beckett is fired from a prominent law firm. Believing that his dismissal had to do with 
his HIV-status (made apparent by KS lesions on his face), Beckett hires Joe Miller, a personal 
injury and small claims lawyer, to represent him in his case against his former employers. The 
controversial case is the first of its kind, and garners immense public attention which is both 
negative and positive. In the end, Beckett and Miller win the case, setting a legal precedent for 
workplace protection from homophobia and AIDSphobia. The heart of the story hinges on the 
relationship between Beckett and Miller; Beckett is white, gay, and HIV-positive while Miller is 
black, straight, and virulently homophobic. Together, the two lawyers fight and win Beckett’s 
case, and develop an unlikely bond in the process. Although Beckett dies at the end of the film 
(losing his other major battle—the fight against AIDS), Miller is permanently transformed by the 
experience of coming to know his client. As one of the first mainstream films about HIV/AIDS, 
the wider implication of Miller’s transformation cannot be understated: along with Miller, it is 
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the audience—including the city, the nation, and the global community—which is also meant to 
be transformed.  
Curiously, while Miller is deeply affected by his relationship with Beckett, the inverse is 
not so; though Beckett is inspired by his professional relationship with Miller and finds 
satisfaction witnessing Miller’s transformation, he is not similarly touched by their encounter. In 
fact, the film suggests that whereas Miller’s relationship with Beckett changes him in ways that 
are surprising to him, Beckett is only reaffirmed in his conviction that, were it not for 
homophobia and AIDSphobia, the two could be friends. After attending a costume party at 
Andrew Beckett’s loft, we witness Miller frantically run home to clutch his sleeping baby in his 
arms, desperately clinging onto the heteronormative life he risks losing by coming into contact 
with Beckett. And yet, while Miller unravels as he is confronted by his own fears and 
misconceptions, Beckett remains strong and supportive4. In fact, it is Beckett’s desire for justice 
and equality which are the catalyst for the lawsuit, and subsequently for Miller’s own 
transformation. In heroic (although humble) determination, Beckett leads the nation (and Miller) 
in the fight against homophobia and AIDSphobia. So where does Philadelphia lead us? 
The metaphoric value of Miller’s transformation—particularly in contrast to Beckett’s 
stoicism and commitment to justice—has as much to do with challenging collective fears about 
homosexuality, as it does supporting white fantasies about black masculinity; that is, the trope of 
the “backwards” black male, a stereotype which is necessarily classed as well. Miller’s 
masculine and coarse character is often contrasted to Beckett’s soft and thoughtful demeanor; he 
is loud, abrasive, and swears frequently while Beckett is a well-read, well-spoken opera 
                                                 
4 To be sure, Beckett’s character is not without its own misgivings: the strong and stoic sufferer is an 
archetype in mainstream representations of oppressed and marginalized people, particularly where death 
is a real threat (see King, 2003, p. 33).  
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enthusiast. Their similarities are also differentiated: although both are lawyers, Miller’s character 
comes across as a sort of “hack” who undermines the law by exploiting his clients’ physical and 
economic vulnerabilities; Beckett, on the other hand, is a skillful and eloquent corporate lawyer 
whose deep appreciation for the law underlies his practice. Miller’s blackness is an 
amalgamation of both racial and class signifiers which make up his inferiority. Likewise, 
Beckett’s whiteness is constituted through white, upper-middle class respectability.  
Although Philadelphia invites the audience to “come together”, it does so by 
reproducing—through Beckett—the moral superiority of whiteness. In doing so, both queer and 
black sexualities remain curiously out of view; sustaining, in their absence, the idea of each as a 
threat to white heteronormativity. Black feminist scholar Patricia Hill-Collins has argued that,  
[t]he purpose of stigmatizing the sexual practices of Black people and those of LGBT 
people may be similar, but the content of the sexual deviance assigned to each differs. 
Black people carry the stigma of promiscuity or excessive or unrestrained heterosexual 
desire. […] In contrast, LGBT people carry the stigma of rejecting heterosexuality by 
engaging in unrestrained homosexual desire (2005, p. 120; original emphasis).  
Though much of the story is predicated on the sexual differences between Becket and Miller, the 
sexualities of each character are contained within the film in ways that white heterosexuality 
rarely is. Even when describing his experience in a porn theatre—the supposed moment in which 
he contracted HIV—Beckett is depicted fully clothed, without even so much as handshake 
shared between the men. Furthermore, his primary sexual relationship with Miguel would appear 
as more of a friendship than a romance. In Miller’s case, his own virulent homophobia supports 
to notion that black heterosexuality is predicated on violence (see Hill-Collins, 2005); Miller 
asserts his own heterosexuality through the violent repudiation of queer sex, rather than respect 
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or appreciation for his wife, or for women in general. Although depicted as a loving father, 
Miller’s sexuality is contained within a worldview that defines black masculinity in terms of 
violence, threat, and animalism (Hill-Collins, 2005, p. 122). Considering that the normative, 
white, heterosexual viewer is barred from fully identifying with either Beckett or Miller, the film 
would seem to suggest that black and gay men (and presumably, black, gay men) are invited to 
participate in the struggle to end AIDS-based discrimination, so long as their sexualities remain 
peripheral, contained within the outdated signifiers with which they continue to be read.  
 Where KS may mark the body of the sexually deviant (in many cases, homosexual) 
HIV/AIDS patient, the black body is also already marked by a series of sexual and racializing 
discourses, all of which orient bodies in particular ways. And yet, Philadelphia does very little to 
demonstrate the ways in which this is so. For instance, if Miller is already marked by his black 
skin, how might he see further discrimination based on his association with Beckett differently? 
In other words, what is at stake for the black body when seen in close proximity to other deviant 
bodies? How is black masculinity read as a form of deviation in itself? If white 
heteronormativity involves the social and sexual reproduction of white bodies and white spaces, 
blackness is always already “out of line” because of its inability to participate in such a 
genealogy. Like queerness, blackness takes shape through this lack: “the black body could be 
described in terms of the bodily and social experience of restriction, uncertainty, and blockage 
[…] To be black or not white in ‘the white world’ is […] to become an object, which means not 
only not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as an effect of the 
bodily contours of others” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 139). As opposed to (or in addition to) an 
expression of homophobic unease, Miller’s unraveling might therefore be read in terms of his 
inability to cope with the double-failure of the black body in line/touch with the queer body. In 
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its failure to explore the ways in which blackness is itself a “stain” Philadelphia stops short of its 
ability to make a meaningful connection between race and sexuality as cooperative elements to 
sexual belonging. 
 
Angels in America 
As we might expect, given the historical context of the play, Angels in America offers a 
more complex reading on the stakes of sexual belonging. In part, this is due to the ways in which 
AIDS is constructed as a problem in each film. Where Philadelphia constructs AIDS as, 
primarily, a humanitarian issue, typical of mainstream representations at the time (see Corber, 
2003), Angels takes a more critical stance towards the issues at stake for those with the disease. 
Contextualizing AIDS within the conservative political climate of the time, Angels “explores the 
possibilities of a radical queer consciousness and community to point the way to a redemptive 
future for an America that has become lost in a haze of radical individualism and conservative 
ennui” (Glaser, 2009, p. 2). Kushner explores the ways in which AIDS is produced through the 
multiple dimensions of human life; including the philosophical and psychoanalytic meanings of 
illness and death, the macro and micro politics of everyday life, and the historicity of human 
suffering. For Kushner, as with many of his contemporaries, AIDS is not a biomedical given, but 
a collection of meanings produced by the social context in which it has emerged. With a more 
critical eye, Angels invites the audience to question the dominant paradigm of “acceptance” 
which was (and arguably continues to be) so prevalent in representations of AIDS. In so doing, 
Kushner develops a story that transcends AIDS specifically, and demands attention to the 
political, social, and historical context in which gay lives are lived. Set predominantly in 1988, 
the play wrestles with the problematics of the Reagan administration’s response to the AIDS 
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epidemic, as well as the effects of neoliberalism and social conservativism on gay men and 
PHAs’ everyday lives. Several questions form the backbone of the play, shaping the lives of each 
character: In the context of so much death, why choose life? How can gay men survive in a 
culture which seems to demand their annihilation? What are the political responsibilities of the 
individual to the future of gay life? In working with these questions, Angels illustrates the 
productive capacity of HIV/AIDS to draw people closer, to create sexual communities in which 
gay life (and life in general) is embraced, celebrated, protected. By harnessing the capacity of 
AIDS to give life—rather than take it—to those with whom it comes into contact, Angels contests 
the boundaries of sexual belonging prescribed by a compulsory heterosexual orientation. 
It could be argued that Joe Miller (Philadelphia), Louis (Angels), and Roy Cohn (Angels) 
find AIDS terrifying for the same reasons. For Cohn, as with Miller in Philadelphia, 
homosexuality is repugnant to the extent that it is an orientation which refuses to “follow the 
straight line”. A gay life, so in conflict with the demands of compulsory heterosexuality, propels 
one into a life of powerlessness and misery. As Cohn declares, “Homosexuals are men who 
know nobody and who nobody knows.” When Joe Pitt, Cohn’s cherished protégé, discloses his 
relationship with Louis, Cohn is horrified. And yet, his reaction has less to do with Pitt’s 
sexuality, than it does with 1) the intimacy he shares with Pitt, as if somehow their proximity to 
one another acts as a stain on Cohn, and 2) the life Pitt leads, telling Joe “I want you home. With 
your wife. Whatever else you got going, cut it dead.” For Cohn, then, it is not necessarily the act 
of homosexual sex that matters so much as what it represents, or, more specifically, where it 
takes us. A homosexual life (not homosexual sex) is incompatible with a successful life; once 
again, as with Joe Miller’s perception of homosexuality, a homosexual life is not worth living. 
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Moreover, a homosexual life is infectious such that to come into contact with it is to succumb to 
its potentially destructive force.  
Although an out, gay man, Louis shares in Miller and Cohn’s unease regarding his 
proximity to HIV/AIDS—the virus, as well as the social myths which surround it. Louis’ fears, 
as I argued in Chapter 1, have as much to do with the precariousness of bodily boundaries as they 
do with the social boundaries which also divide us. After all, Louis justifies his departure in 
terms of his need for self-preservation, and the limits of human interdependency. On a larger 
scale, as with Miller and Cohn, Louis’ anxieties harness wider concerns about the affective 
power of HIV/AIDS to touch those around it. Consider again Louis’ conversation with the rabbi 
at the beginning of the film. Responding to the rabbi’s inquiry as to why a person would abandon 
an ill loved one, Louis replies: 
[…] Maybe because this person’s sense of the world, that it will change for the better 
with struggle, maybe a person who has this neo-Hegelian positivist sense of constant 
historical progress towards happiness or perfection or something, who feels very 
powerful because he feels connected to these forces, moving uphill all the time…maybe 
that person can’t, um, incorporate sickness into his sense of how things are supposed to 
go […] (Kushner, 2004, p. 31).  
Implicitly, Louis is drawing a distinction between a life with (or in proximity to) AIDS and a life 
of value. Queer theorists have long engaged with the relation between normative sexuality and 
shared fantasies of a proper or “good” life. As Berlant and Warner have argued, 
Ideologies and institutions of intimacy are increasingly offered as a vision of the good life 
[…] A complex cluster of sexual practices gets confused, in heterosexual culture, with 
the love plot of intimacy and familialism that signifies belonging to society in a deep and 
59 
 
normal way. Community is imagined through scenes of intimacy, coupling, and kinship: 
a historical relation to futurity is restricted to generational narrative and reproduction 
(1998, p. 553-554). 
Thus if Louis is fearful of where AIDS may take him, his fears are grounded in the failure of 
being misaligned with what Ahmed conceives of as the “straight line”, “whereby straightness 
gets attached to other values including decent, conventional, direct, and honest” (2006, p. 70)—
the compulsory alignment with certain objects and orientations (beyond and in addition to sexual 
object choice) indicative of a “good life”.  The good life is of course therefore untouched by 
AIDS’ disruptive and destructive force. As Ahmed describes it, “[a] happy life, a good life, […] 
hence involves the regulation of desire. […] Happiness is what directs you toward the good, 
while creating the impression that the good is what gives you direction” (2010, p. 37-38). For 
Louis, as with Miller and Cohn, AIDS is disorienting such that it impedes the subject’s 
progression towards happiness, where “happiness” is defined by the approximation of white, 
able-bodied heteronormativity. Louis’ rejection of Prior is a simultaneous rejection of being 
misaligned with, or oriented away from, a good life. 
Upon disclosing his first lesion to Louis—a medical indicator that his HIV status has 
progressed to full-blown AIDS—Louis wonders why Prior did not tell him sooner. Prior replies, 
“I was scared, Lou…That you’ll leave me.” This is a curious, and yet, in some sense, familiar 
reaction. We might expect Prior to respond that his fear of death was solidified by this new 
symptom, and that this fear drove him to secrecy. And yet, what most terrifies him is 
abandonment—his body becoming undesirable in the eyes of his lover and partner. As we come 
to find out, Prior’s anticipation of his boyfriend’s departure is validated; Louis leaves him shortly 
after he enters the hospital. In some sense, the storyline between Louis and Prior is confirmation 
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that, “that’s how the story goes”: HIV/AIDS is an infectious and terrifying disease, the 
consequence of which is a “social death” akin to the physical. In this story Prior is not only 
justified in fearing abandonment, he is deserving of it. And yet, in the end Prior triumphs; Prior 
is ultimately thrust back into a life of love and togetherness. By telling another version of the 
story, Angels problematizes the binary between a life with AIDS and a life of value. In the end, 
Angels challenges the inevitability of AIDS to destroy us. 
In Philadelphia the story is this: people with AIDS are “disabled” to the extent that the 
stigma surrounding AIDS severs their ability to participate in society. Addressing a mainstream 
audience, the film invites us to “come together” (by abandoning misconceptions about AIDS) 
while nevertheless reinforcing the boundaries upon which compulsory heterosexuality rests—
ultimately, sexual others remain contained within a value system which requires their peripheral 
existence. While Angels recognizes the importance of the political barriers facing people with 
AIDS (PWAs), it does so at the same time as it recognizes the cultures of resistance that are 
embedded within the epidemic as well. Challenging the “isolated outcast” (Dean, 2009, p. 78) 
trope, Angels focuses instead on the ways in which PWAs and their loved ones forge close bonds 
based on their mutual care, love, and responsibility to the communities of which they are a 
part—however painful and complicated it may be. In this case it is those characters which turn 
their back on community who pay the price of solitude, rather than the diagnosis itself.  
In a larger sense, then, Louis’ departure from Prior is not only a rejection of a loved one, 
but a refusal to bear the responsibilities of belonging to a culture sustained in relation to AIDS. 
By refusing to care for Prior, Louis turns his back on the community ties which sustain him. 
Ironically, his desire for self-preservation—which compels him to leave Prior in the first place—
is most threatened when he leaves. Without Prior, Louis unravels. If, as I argued, queer and black 
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bodies are largely characterized through lack, Angels counters this narrative by demonstrating 
the ways in which marginalized bodies such as these bear their own genealogies. In other words, 
although black and queer bodies are, in some sense, constituted through the “bodily and social 
experience of restriction” (Ahmed 2006, p. 139) because of their incapacity to replicate (and thus 
participate in) white heterosexuality, this is not to say that they are altogether incapable of action: 
in their marginality, queer bodies create their own genealogical attachments. As Ahmed argues,  
It is the very social and existential experience of loneliness that compels the lesbian body 
to extend into other kinds of space, where there are others who return one’s desire. What 
is compelling, then, is how this story of the loneliness of lesbian desire searches for a 
different form of sociality, a space in which the lesbian body can extend itself, as a body 
that gets near other bodies, which tends towards others who are alike insofar as they also 
deviate and pervert the lines of desire (2006, p. 105).  
For Kushner, AIDS plays a central role in forming and strengthening a sense of queer belonging. 
Louis’ “redemption” for turning his back on Prior requires him to turn back around, to face 
AIDS once again. In doing so Louis accepts his proximity to the disease, almost as if it is a 
familial attachment itself, as we witness in the final scene. It is now 1990—four years following 
Prior’s ascent to Heaven and decision to choose life. Louis, Prior, Belize and Hannah (Joe’s 
mother) sit on the rim of the Bethesda Fountain in Central Park. Typical of a family-like sense of 
togetherness, the group laugh, quarrel, and make fun of one another. It is clear that there is a 
strong bond shared among them. Gathering together, occupying urban space, Prior and his 
chosen family and friends demonstrate the capacity and desire of PWAs and their communities 
to create something out of and through an AIDS diagnosis. I parallel these generative practices to 
Tim Dean’s notion of “breeding culture” (2009, p. 48). Although Dean’s analysis refers to a 
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highly specific sexual subculture—in which participants seek out unprotected sexual encounters 
for the purposes of either semen transfer and/or seroconversion—his work is an example of the 
reproductive possibilities for HIV/AIDS communities. Dean argues, 
Gay men have discovered that one of the things they can do with HIV I use it to create 
solidarity and form communities. […] HIV transmission has the potential to create social 
bonds that are both symbolic and material; membership is etched onto the body like a 
tattoo. […] Countering the image of the person with AIDS as an isolated outcast, 
voluntary seroconversion has come to be understood as a new basis for community 
formation (2009, p. 77-78). 
Although Dean refers specifically to voluntary seroconversion, it is clear from the incredible 
outpour of AIDS activism throughout the 1980s that creating solidarity and forming communities 
around HIV/AIDS has been built into the epidemic long before barebacking and bug-chasing 
emerged as relatively organized subcultural practices. From early on, HIV/AIDS has had the 
capacity to unite those infected and affected (see Gill-Peterson, 2013; Gould, 2009).  
 The generative capacity of AIDS is not only indicated in this final scene. As a 
definitively gay text5 Angels is itself a form of genealogical work. Where Philadelphia is based 
on the assumption that the AIDS patient is a sort of national “stranger” who must be welcomed 
inward, Angels is directive insofar as it extends the queer/AIDS body outward, performing the 
very productive capacity of AIDS which is so central to the film. After all, it is Hannah—the 
straight, Mormon mother of the profoundly closeted Joe—who is welcomed into Prior’s family, 
                                                 
5 Again, I mean this less in terms of its “authenticity” as a queer perspective, than Kushner’s own 
positionality as a gay man, as well as its intended gay/queer audience. Given my analysis of Angels 
differences from Philadelphia, I am also referring to the play’s/film’s anti-heteronormative subtext and 




accepted for who she is despite her initial generational, political, or spiritual differences. The 
mainstream success of the film—featured as it was on HBO, and including such famous actors as 
Al Pacino and Meryl Streep—extends outward as well, reaching audiences who may have never 
otherwise come into contact with either the original play or its subversive content.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have made the claim that social belonging is inscribed on and through the 
skin. In doing so, I have extended the concept of the skin as a boundary separating (and yet 
mediating the relationship between) self from the world, to include the surfaces which constitute 
social belonging. Not only may we draw parallels between the surface of the body and the 
contours of social space but, as Ahmed contends, each is involved in a mutually productive 
relationship; social space impresses upon and shapes the body as it is itself transformed by the 
bodies which inhabit it. Sexual citizenship is constituted, therefore, through the relationship 
between bodies and space. While some bodies coalesce, others (such as queer bodies and AIDS 
bodies) are distanced—i.e., marked by their incapacity to meet the demands required of a 
heteronormative life. Sexuality and sexual belonging can therefore be considered orientations: it 
is the ways in which desire moves us which constitutes the boundaries of sexual membership. 
Specifically, “the normalization of heterosexuality as an orientation toward “the other sex’ can 
be redescribed in terms of the requirement to follow a straight line” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 70).  
The films in my analysis are directive; each film is moving insofar as it impels the 
audience towards or away from certain bodies based on their affective recognition and shared 
orientations. While Philadelphia invites the audience to come together by inviting the AIDS 
body inward, it does so ironically by confirming the superiority of white heteronormativity and 
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replicating many of the assumptions that constitute the exclusion of queer and non-normative 
bodies to begin with. KS functions as a stain on Beckett’s body, much like the blackness of Joe’s 
skin. Although the film makes interventions into the logic whereby Beckett is stigmatized, it 
does not do so for Joe’s blackness, ultimately limiting its transformative capacity. Challenging 
the assumption that AIDS is invariably fatal—in the physical as well as social sense—Angels in 
America focuses instead on the generative capacity of the disease. Through Prior’s devotion to 
life, to living, as well as the close social and familial bonds formed and tended within the film, 
Angels undermines the terms of sexual belonging. The AIDS body is figured as a productive (and 
loved) member within a community, extending outward and towards other bodies. In my next 
chapter I will examine more closely the relationship between discourses about death (and life) 






 Death and the skin 
 
Introduction 
Recent scholarship in queer temporality has made a number of critical interventions into 
conventional time: the authors draw on the past, present, and future together in order to engage 
with the affective and political uses of time, memory, haunting, and becoming (see Halberstam, 
2005; Love, 2007; Munoz, 2009). Contesting the prevailing view of time as linear, this body of 
work emphasizes the ways in which the past and the future are always embedded in the present. 
As such, writing in queer temporality has provided a conceptual backdrop for my own project: 
my engagement with these early texts has given insight into the legacy of the past; early 
representations of AIDS reveal cultural anxieties related to queer sexualities and health that are 
as much relevant today as they were twenty years ago. Several theorists working in this area 
have commented on the effect of HIV/AIDS on our individual and collective sense of time (see 
Bruhm 2011; Dean 2011). In fact, Bruhm argues that HIV/AIDS has been critical to the temporal 
turn in queer theory as a whole:  
The work of Sedgwick and others has shown us how the age of queer theory and the age 
of AIDS have aligned to produce ‘a plethora of phenomenologies organized around two 
axes: On the one hand, sexual, gendered, and racial deroutinizations, and, on the other, 
deroutinizations of a disorienting and unpredictable temporal kind’ (Barber & Clark qtd. 
p. 316-317).  
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While HIV/AIDS may be a crucial underpinning to scholarly interest in time, queer temporality 
is relevant in a broad sense. John Erni has argued that “[e]very epidemic has a temporal 
language, a set of narratives about the disease’s origin or cause, its development in time (and 
space), and a network of material practices by which it can be controlled according to past and 
future technologies” (1994, p. 69). The discourses and material practices which constitute the 
temporal language of illness—its cause, its method of transmission, fatality, and curability—also 
construct the bodies with whom the disease comes into contact. In Erni’s words, “[t]he body in 
illness exists as an image and narrative of time” (1994, p. 75). I argue that the AIDS body—its 
image and narrative in time—is fundamentally shaped by cultural attitudes towards death. 
Particularly in the beginning of the epidemic, AIDS was characterized by finitude; that is, people 
diagnosed with AIDS faced a virtually inevitable death. Not surprisingly, then, much of the work 
written about temporality and AIDS takes death as its main object. Despite a waning North 
American death toll the overwhelming majority of HIV/AIDS literature as a whole continues to 
be preoccupied with the dead or future-dead. Both Philadelphia and Angels are emblematic of a 
set of collective (and yet, conflicting) feelings about AIDS at an earlier moment in the epidemic; 
each film demonstrates how and why collective feelings about death impress upon, and shape, 
the AIDS body. 
  Expanding on an argument made in the previous chapter, I suggest that where the queer 
body is constituted through its failure to meet the demands of reproductive heterosexuality, it is 
at the same time constituted through finitude, through death. As Heather Love tragically reminds 
us, “[t]he history of Western representation is littered with the corpses of gender and sexual 
deviants. Those who are directly identified with same-sex desire most often end up dead; if they 
manage to survive it is on such compromised terms that it makes death seem attractive” (2007, p. 
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1). The emergence of AIDS has only reaffirmed this attachment (see Bersani, 1987). As the 
number of gay deaths mounted in the early part of the epidemic, it became more and more 
difficult to think otherwise; and in the epidemic’s wake, queerness and death remain fixed in a 
metaphoric bond6. As Tim Dean points out, even as HIV/AIDS has transformed from an 
invariable death sentence into a chronic condition, public health campaigns and popular 
knowledge about AIDS continue to emphasize its fatality: 
It is as important to underscore that not everyone who is infected with HIV gets sick as it 
is to emphasize that antiretroviral drugs come with no guarantee and do not work for 
everyone. The fact that the latter point tends to get repeated more frequently than the 
former,  especially in mainstream accounts of barebacking, betrays a disguised though no 
less punitive wish that those who indulge in risky sex should succumb to the original 
AIDS narrative of sickness and death, preferably sooner rather than later. In other words, 
the perfectly true statement of fact—that drugs don’t work for everyone—carries a 
supplementary rhetorical charge motivated by the desire to ensure barebackers pay for 
what typically is regarded as their excessive pleasure […] When it comes to bareback sex 
[perhaps gay sex in general], most people prefer to hear about gay men who are dying 
rather than living their lives. (2011, p. 78; my emphasis) 
As I suggested in my introductory chapter, ill bodies—and especially those with HIV/AIDS—are 
perceived, in some sense, to be already dead. And yet, there is an interesting paradox underlying 
                                                 
6 To be sure, HIV/AIDS has always been more closely associated with the gay male body than with 
lesbians and others on the spectrum of “queer” sexuality. I maintain, however, that queerness (as opposed 
to male homosexuality) is an appropriate category for my discussion. The conceptual category “queer” 
can be used to denote a whole range of intersectional, non-normative cultures, politics, and sexual 
identities that may be lost under the more common LGBT, but which are nevertheless closely associated 
(conceptually, historically, metaphorically) with HIV/AIDS and, consequently, with death (i.e. sex work, 
drug-use and party culture, transsexuality/transfemininity, sexual promiscuity, and so on).  
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such interpretations of the disease. The “scientific crusade against [HIV/AIDS]” constitutes an 
ambivalent relation to the virus. “The paradox of curability/incurability,” as Erni goes onto argue 
“…is rooted in the much broader linguistic, political, and fantasy terrain surrounding the 
epidemic, where the widespread, if not endemic, perception of AIDS has consistently fluctuated 
between the rhetorics of hope/hopelessness, death/salvation, body/antibody” (1994, p. 70). Thus, 
the paradox of the living corpse is built into the very existence of the disease. Eric Savoy has 
also commented on the AIDS body as a sort of living corpse, an absent presence: “Because the 
seropositive patient is culturally constructed as already ill, in some sense already dead, and as a 
profoundly toxic agent, his or her body becomes readable only as the (HIV) anti-body, the 
presence that signals the absence” (qtd. Bruhm 2011, p. 318). It is important, however, not to 
overstate AIDS’ ambivalent relation to death: fluctuating rhetorics of hope/hopelessness and 
death/salvation do not undo the myth that AIDS is invariably fatal; rather, they suggest that death 
is only a matter of time. In other words, whether lengthened or shortened—given the biomedical 
and social context in which one lives—the life of a person with HIV/AIDS remains shadowed by 
death. Despite changes in the social perception of HIV/AIDS from a death-sentence to a chronic 
illness, AIDS-related stigma continues to be motivated by fears about death (see Mawar et al, 
2005; for a discussion of changes in the perception of AIDS see Scandlyn, 2000). It appears that 
Erni’s 1994 work remains a concern, where he writes,  
Even though in recent years, as a result of increased understanding of the disease, the 
plague model of interpretation has been shifted to the chronic disease model, […] the 
discourse about the horror of AIDS remains dangerously pervasive. New understanding 
has not shattered the intensive social discussion of the HIV as the impossible obstacle in 
the scientific crusade against the disease, the culprit of horror (p. 40).  
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Given the lengthy historical attachment of queerness to death or near-death, it is perhaps not 
surprising that an HIV/AIDS diagnosis is still conceived of as a death sentence. 
This symbolic attachment underlies early AIDS representations that were preoccupied 
with the skin, and particularly the lesions which seemed to mark the body of every AIDS patient 
near death. A cultural and medical history of the skin reveals its persistent association with 
human mortality (see Connor, 2004). Whether the skin is perceived to contain, protect, make 
vulnerable, or stand in for the body itself (all of which have been its preferred metaphoric role at 
one time or another), the skin is always both the requirement/condition for life and the body’s 
vulnerability to death. In Latin, this dual purpose is signified with two separate words:  
cutis […] signified the living skin, the skin that protects, that expresses and arouses and 
that is the subject of care and beautifying attention. […] Pellis, by contrast, is the dead, 
the flayed skin. Once scoured away from the body, the human or animal skin becomes 
simply a hide, deader than a corpse, a corpse’s remnant, the corpse of a corpse (Connor, 
2004, p. 11; original emphasis).  
If skin is the prerequisite to life, any rupture or disfigurement to the skin signals the potential for 
death. Contemporary popular representations of the skin are also frequently linked to human 
vitality or mortality. Advertisements for beauty products often link the appearance of youthful, 
“fresh”, or “radiant” skin with youth itself (see LaWare & Moustatsos, 2013; Sandikci, 1996). 
Conversely, burgeoning public interest and anxiety over such skin disturbances as HPV—the 
virus associated with genital warts—appeal to the association of non-normative skins with 
mortality (see Polzer & Knabe, 2012). In their obsessive documentation of dark, purple lesions, 
early representations of AIDS harness the dual metaphors of queerness as death, and skin 
disturbance as death.  
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It may also be argued that non-normative and/or disfigured skins are “queer” to the extent 
that their pathology is often described/constituted in much the same way as sexual others’. 
Frequently associated with sexual perversion, contagion, and death, skin disturbances of all sorts 
have been a source of medical, moral, and social panic throughout history (see Prosser, 2001). 
As documented in my chapter on disability, Robert Roberts has documented to emergence of 
“the herpetic” in the mid-1970s, “a new pariah ostensibly produced by and reproducing a society 
that has lost its moral compass” (1997, p. 265). Likewise, Raymond Donovan has documented 
the development, in biomedical and popular knowledge, of a conceptual link between KS and 
homosexuality. In each case skin disturbances have been constituted and reconstituted 
intersectionally with social and sexual deviancy. While this is particularly true for sexually 
transmitted infections such as genital warts, many other non-contagious/non-sexual skin diseases 
have also been subjected to intense scrutiny (see Anderson, 1998; Bashford, 2000; Bashford & 
Hooker, 2001; Prosser, 2001). Disfigured skin, like sexual outsiders, are marked by contagion. 
Consequently, queer/AIDS bodies are “skinned” as the “absent present that signals the absence”’ 
the body which is subject to decay. 
Regardless of their sense of the AIDS body as dead or alive, each film demonstrates the 
ways in which death nevertheless makes an impression on the queer/AIDS body; that is, both 
Philadelphia and Angels are representations of the ways in which cultural repertoires of death 
and dying constitute the contours of belonging for those with HIV/AIDS. In the section that 
follows, I discuss each film’s narrative of death and the AIDS body. I argue that while 
Philadelphia confirms, for the audience, that AIDS is invariably fatal and that queer bodies are 




Queer deaths, queer lives 
 The management of human life, termed “biopolitics” by Foucault, is widely accepted as a 
key facet of modern government; the capacity to regulate both life and death is therefore vital to 
the exercise of power (see Foucault, 2003; Mbembe, 2003; Posel & Gupta, 2009). “Likewise,” 
argue Posel and Gupta,  
it is impossible to understand the dynamics of nationalism and nation building […] 
without identifying the place of death and the corpse in particular, as a pre-eminent site 
for the identification of symbolic boundaries between a nation and its other, revealed in 
the redemption of glory and purpose in the lives of those who define and die for the 
imagined community of the nation (2009, p. 300-301).  
Set at a time following the long and public silence of the Reagan era which began the epidemic, 
each film carries with it an historical attachment to the dead; a public enemy from its very 
emergence, the HIV/AIDS body has taken shape in the context of a biopolitics preoccupied with 
its disappearance. The virtual inaction and silence on the part of the US government to address 
HIV/AIDS as a public health concern helped to construct the AIDS patient as both non-existent 
and contained within a small subset of the population. Associated with homosexuality, a 
“lifestyle” which was already perceived to be disposable as far as the general population was 
concerned, the AIDS body was at once vilified and invisibilized. The failure at the federal level 
to address AIDS further shaped the AIDS corpse as tangential to the nation. J.E. Troyer’s (2010) 
research has shown, for instance, in an article responding to a growing sense of uncertainty 
regarding what to do with AIDS victims’ bodies, the National Funeral Directors Association 
initially condoned funeral directors and embalmers refusal of bodies deceased by AIDS-related 
illnesses. This was done at the same time as the organization officially disapproved of such 
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discrimination, maintaining that the funeral service had a “deep obligation to the public” (Strub 
& Frederick qtd. Troyer, 2010, p. 135). As Troyer argues, these discursive and institionalized 
practices secured “the American HIV/AIDS corpse [as] doubly problematic by its exotic 
‘otherness,’” (2010, p. 135). Simon Watney has also addressed the HIV/AIDS corpse, 
Thus, even and especially in the clair-obscur of death itself, the ‘homosexual body,’ 
which is also that of the ‘AIDS victim,’ must be publicly seen to be humiliated, thrown 
around in zip-up plastic bags, fumigated, denied burial, lest there be any acknowledgment 
of the slightest sense of loss. Thus the ‘homosexual body’ continues to speak after death, 
not as a memento mori, but as its exact reverse, for a life that must at all costs be seen to 
have been devoid of value, unregretted, unlamented, and-final indignity--effaced into a 
mere anonymous statistic. The "homosexual body" is "disposed of," like so much 
rubbish, like the trash it was in life. (Watney, 1987, p. 80) 
As narratives about death (“who lives, who dies, how and in whose name” [Posel and Gupta p. 
300]) shape the contours of belonging, they not only inform how we interpret or feel about dying 
bodies, but how or why certain bodies appear more dead than others. As Troyer has elsewhere 
argued, the “formulation of the postmortem condition stipulates a field of relations between the 
human corpse and the living human body where neither concretely defines the other, despite the 
rules and regulations that make sharp legal contrasts between the two bodies (2007, p. 24). I 
argue that as discourses about death serve to constitute the borders between the living and the 
dead (however fragile they may be), they also constitute boundaries between living bodies; while 
some bodies are more closely associated with life (and therefore membership and participation 
within a given community), other bodies perceived as closer to death through their engagement 
in “high-risk” and/or pathological behaviour. As such, the characters in Philadelphia and Angels 
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live and die in dramatically different ways, given each film’s position relative to hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic discourses about the dead.  
In her article on the criminal corpse, Ruth Penfold-Mounce examines the “social 
consumption whereby the corpse is consumed as an object of fascinated interest which can be 
consumed” through media, and other forms of archival documentation (2010, p. 251). I argue 
that Philadelphia reads as a sort of “pornography of death,” (Tait, 2006, p. 50); or more 
accurately, of the living corpse—the absent-presence—of the dying queer. Although Beckett is 
still alive (until his death at the end of the film), and therefore not a corpse per se, the 
consumption of dying bodies as well forms part of the matrix in which certain bodies are 
perceived of as 1) more dead than others and therefore less a part of the social fabric; 2) 
deserving of death because of their criminality and/or deviance; 3) more meaningful in death 
than in life; the gay body, largely in the earlier part of the epidemic, served as both a reminder of 
the risks inherent to queer life, as well as a source of inspiration and social change through 
bearing witness to its suffering (see Gilman, 1987). The juxtapositions of Beckett’s dying body 
with the liveliness of those around him exaggerates the sense in which he is already dead. The 
image of Beckett’s large, extended family draws attention to his own shortcomings: Miguel and 
he appear naked, insignificant, sterile in contrast to the fertile heteronormative family of which 
he is apart. As Beckett’s family brings new life into the world, Beckett himself is surrounded by 
and exemplary of death. While on the one hand Beckett’s family exemplifies whiteness as 
progressive and forward-thinking (particularly, as I have mentioned, in contrast to the blue 
collar, black, and violently homophobic family of Joe Miller), it also serves as a template for the 
discrepancies between heterosexuality and homosexuality; specifically that heterosexuality 
fosters life, while homosexuality occasions death. Narratives about death—about who is “more 
74 
 
dead” than others, and whose life is worth saving—shape Beckett’s physicality as well. In 
contrast to Beckett’s pale, KS-ridden, and gaunt body, Miss Benedict, a heterosexual woman 
living with AIDS who is called as a witness for the defense is notably not ill; while Beckett 
struggles to stay alive, his body growing sicker every day, Miss Benedict appears healthy and 
present. Miss Benedict’s character challenges the prevailing idea at the time that people with 
AIDS were “already sick, in some sense already dead,” and yet, her body reiterates the 
association of queerness with death through her relative health. It is noteworthy that Miss 
Benedict acquired HIV from a blood transfusion while giving birth—the apex of heterosexuality, 
giving life itself. In fact, the only other person known to have AIDS in the film—an unnamed 
gay man with whom Beckett is friends—is also pale, gaunt, and sickly, giving the impression 
that “gay AIDS” is somehow more deadly than its “straight” counterpart. In culmination, these 
images strengthen the metaphorical between queerness and death; and between the AIDS body 
and death.  
Angels in America is also a lengthy depiction of the death and near-death of two of its 
main characters: Roy Cohn and Prior Walters. And yet, as I argued in my previous chapter, the 
familial attachments between queers (both with and without AIDS) alter the ways in which death 
impresses upon the bodies who are threatened by it; the life-giving and life-affirming 
relationships in the film transform queerness/AIDS from finitude to possibility.  Over the course 
of the film, Cohn mutates from a powerful and well-dressed lawyer, to a depleted body 
overwhelmed by KS lesions. And yet, “more sores than skin,” Cohn nevertheless remains as 
outspoken and wicked as ever, until the moment of his death. Cohn is a depiction of tremendous 
strength—he clings to life, to his values, to his integrity, however controversial he may be. There 
is a marked contrast between Cohn’s KS-ridden body and Beckett’s. Whereas Beckett appears 
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weak, incapacitated by his body, Cohn remains foul, angry, and outspoken despite his body’s 
failings. Prior’s body also undergoes a transformation; donned in a cape and hood, walking with 
a limp and cane, Prior begins to take on the appearance of a Prophet. Prior’s quick wit and 
charm, persist, despite how sick he becomes; ultimately, the comedy of his death is integral to 
his survival.  
 Capturing the humility, vulnerability, and the strength of each character, Angels reads 
less as a pornographic fascination for the living corpse of an AIDS patient, than a complex 
portrayal of the stakes of queer survival. In part, I attribute its complexity to its sense of self-
reflexivity as a queer text. Neither vilifying nor glamourizing the AIDS patient, Angels portrays 
the multiple dimensions of living and dying with AIDS. Without a reproductive heterosexuality 
to compare them to, the characters in Angels forge their own genealogical attachments7. 
Additionally by confronting head-on the social and political context in which gay men live and 
die, Angels calls attention to the ways in which certain lives are considered valuable and others 
are not. Specifically, access to medical advancements and life-saving healthcare structure the 
field in which living with AIDS becomes a death sentence or not. Through magical realism, 
Kushner also transcends these limitations, creating the possibility for alternative realities, 
alternative destinies for those facing death. Prior’s fantastical visions and role as Prophet imagine 
a world in which gay men are capable of self-determination. Told that in order to save ourselves, 
humanity must give up our need from progress, forward momentum, and migration, Prior makes 
an impassioned plea for life, defying the Angels’ demand for human mortality:  
                                                 
7In fact, the only heterosexual couple in the film is, as we find out, queer all along. While Joe lives in 
deep denial of his sexuality, Harper struggles desperately with mental illness and addiction. Harper and 




We can’t just stop. We’re not rocks—progress, migration, motion is…modernity. It’s 
animate, it’s what living things do. We desire. Even if all we desire is stillness, it’s still 
desire for (Kushner, p. 263-264).  
Choosing life—for humanity as well as for himself—Prior rejects the case that death is inherent 
to suffering, or to illness,  
I want more life. I can’t help myself. I do. I’ve lived through such terrible times, and 
there are people who live through much much worse, but…You see them living anyways. 
When they’re more spirit than body, more sores than skin, when they’re burned and in 
agony, when flies lay eggs in the corners of the eyes of their children, the live. Death 
usually has to take life away. I don’t know if it’s just the animal. I don’t know if it’s not 
braver to die. But I recognize the habit. The addiction to being alive. We live past hope. 
If I can find hope anywhere, that’s it, that’s the best I can do. It’s so much not enough, so 
inadequate but … Bless me anyways. I want more life (Kushner, p. 266-267) 
Prior rejects the heteronormative desire to see the AIDS body as already dead, as a living corpse. 
He proclaims “Even sick. I want to be alive” (p. 265). Of course, one cannot necessarily 
“choose” life as Prior does; the socio-economic factors which lengthen or shorten life have had a 
dramatic effect on the epidemic as a whole—a point which Kushner poignantly makes through 
the character of Roy Cohn. And yet, Prior’s choice, however otherworldly, writes another 
possibility for the AIDS body; in defiant opposition to the AIDS body as already dead, Angels 
emphasizes the productive capacity—the desire to live, to move, to love, and to create—of those 
faced with the possibility of death.  
 
Queer futurity and the future as promise 
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Another way to demonstrate how narratives about death shape the social and bodily 
contours of belonging is to look towards the future. The regulation of life and death is also a 
means of managing the future; the denial or promise of social belonging shapes the possible 
directions our lives will take—where we will end up, and how we will get there—and even the 
possibility of a future at all. Consider the future as a horizon. Describing the productive capacity 
of the horizon, Ahmed writes,  
The bodily horizon shows what bodies can reach toward by establishing a line beyond 
which they cannot reach; the horizon marks the edge of what can be reached by the body. 
The body becomes present as a body, with surfaces and boundaries, in showing the 
‘limits’ of what it can do (2006, p. 55).  
How we imagine the future, therefore, is prescriptive of whose body is within reach, whose body 
is aligned with our own, and whose body is positioned with us such that we may move forward 
together. If some bodies are within reach, it follows that some bodies are certainly not. Ahmed 
concludes, “[t]he surfaces of bodies are shaped by what is reachable. Indeed, the history of 
bodies can be rewritten as the history of what is reachable” (2006, p. 55). As we move toward 
the horizon—the future—then, certain bodies move with us or within reach. As I have argued, 
constituted through lack, through finitude, and through backwardness (all versions of the same 
concept) the future of queerness has always been in question. Whether “[p]erverse, immature, 
sterile, [or] melancholic” (Love, 2007, p. 6) queer bodies are misaligned with what falls in the 
scope of a reproductive heternormativity, remaining out of reach/touch with hegemonic visions 
of the future. As Love continues, “even when [queers] provoke fears about the future they 
somehow also recall the past” (p. 6); queerness is continually located behind us such that it can 
never join us in the present. Each film makes a set of assumptions about the future: about what is 
78 
 
possible, what is desirable, who will populate it, and how we should strive to get there. Providing 
commentary on the present with the hopes of inspiring a better future, each film imagines and 
produces the affective community presumably needed to get there. As Ahmed contends, 
“…happiness involves a way of being aligned with others, of facing the right way” (Ahmed, 
2010, p. 45). The ways in which each film reproduces, or imagines, affective alignments tells us 
something about the future it inspires. In this way, both Philadelphia and Angels are generative; 
drawing on and triggering emotional attachments (to objects, values, desires) they each 
encourage their own vision of the future, of what is and what should be possible. Political 
encouragement is not value-neutral, as Ahmed reminds us: 
To be encouraging is often thought of as a generous [sic], as a way of energizing 
somebody, of enabling them to be capable. To encourage can be to give courage. But to 
encourage can also be forceful. Being encouraged can be a way of being directed towards 
somebody else’s wants (Ahmed, 2010, p. 47).  
Is the future imagined in each film, a future promising to queers, to people with AIDS, and other 
social/sexual outsiders? For people characterized by finitude, marked by death, there is much at 
stake in the promise of a future and the type of future it will be.   
Philadelphia concludes at Andrew Beckett’s wake, held in the loft apartment he shares 
with his partner, Miguel. Beckett succumbs to his illness at the same time as he experiences a 
victory, losing his battle to AIDS while winning the groundbreaking case against his former 
employer. As I argued in my chapter on disability, despite his illness and eventual death, 
Beckett’s intervention into the law permits him to exceed his disability, to “live on” as it were, 
through the legal precedent set by his case for the civil rights of people with AIDS. Celebrating 
with Beckett, we imagine a future for people with AIDS free from discrimination and protected 
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by the law to ensure their full participation and acceptance in society. Beckett’s historical legacy 
outweighs his physical death. This is perhaps the most obvious, and “profound” message of the 
film. At first glance, then, it appears that Philadelphia challenges the dominant message at the 
time; that AIDS is invariably fatal and that people with AIDS have no future. But if Beckett 
achieves immortality through his legal achievements, what can be done for the vast majority who 
die making no such contribution to history? Are they forever lost in the epidemic?  
 The future alluded to in Philadelphia is predicated on a set of assumptions regarding the 
social good. In part, this has to do with how the film defines and constructs the problems of the 
present. As I have previously discussed, Philadelphia constructs AIDS as a matter of law; a 
sociolegal issue in which people with AIDS (and their communities) are not extended protection 
under law, thereby leaving them vulnerable to discrimination. This understanding of the problem 
rests on the belief that 1) PWAs are “disabled” to the extent that they do not have equal 
protection under the law; and 2) while not perfect in its present form, the law is ultimately 
concerned with the best interests of PWAs. The problem is therefore not the law itself, but its 
current form. If the law does not exist apart from the discursive practices by which it is 
constituted, and constitutive of, then to define a problem in legal terms is precisely to constitute 
the problem itself (see Rose & Valverde, 1998). In fact, the law remains instrumental in not only 
discriminating against, but criminalizing, queers and PWAs. Twenty years following the film’s 
release the legal status of people with HIV/AIDS is perhaps more precarious than ever. In the 
United States (as well as many countries internationally), existing assault and public health laws 
are extensively used to prosecute and incarcerate people with HIV/AIDS. Many jurisdictions in 
the US have added HIV-specific laws to their criminal codes as a means of prosecuting alleged 
HIV-exposure and HIV non-disclosure cases (Lazzarini et al, 2013). In its appeal to the law, 
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Philadelphia obscures the ways in which certain bodies are criminalized and persecuted, at the 
same time as they may be afforded specific “protections” under it. 
 As a result of its emphasis on the law, Philadelphia loses site of one of the most 
fundamental issues affecting the everyday lives of PWAs throughout the epidemic: access to 
quality healthcare (see WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF, 2009). Despite his death, Beckett’s 
economic status allows him to skirt many of the issues facing people with AIDS (particularly at 
the time) in relation to healthcare access. Given Philadelphia’s arguable pornographic attention 
to the dying, gay male body, the absence of a political engagement with healthcare is particularly 
relevant. If the politics of AIDS healthcare is rooted in a desire to preserve and extend the lives 
of people with AIDS, its absence can only read as a statement of ambivalence. As I said, 
although Beckett may achieve immortality through the law, the same cannot be said for those 
who make no such contribution. The future Philadelphia aspires to, then, would seem to have 
little to do with whether or not people with AIDS actually get there—so long as they are 
protected under the law. Assuming they do survive, however, what would their future look like?  
 Philadelphia’s vision of the future is perhaps best exemplified through the relationship 
between Beckett and Joe Miller. Joe is transformed through his contact with Beckett, learning to 
see the humanity in Beckett. By extension, the audience (who is presumably heterosexual and/or 
seronegative) are similarly touched by such an encounter; through Joe, the audience bears 
witness to the suffering of people with AIDS, transforming misunderstanding and fear into 
compassion and acceptance. Despite Joe’s affective metamorphosis Beckett is not similarly 
transformed by this encounter; reproducing dominant narratives on race, Beckett paves the way 
toward a future free from discrimination, awakening him to his own ignorance. However, 
Beckett’s stoicism in response to Joe’s virulent homophobia also seems to suggest queers bear 
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the responsibility of “appropriate” conduct in order to live peacefully—even harmoniously—
with the mainstream. That is, Philadelphia is instructive of both heterosexual and homosexual 
responses to homophobia and AIDSphobia; as heterosexual people are encouraged to accept gays 
and PWAs, gays and PWAs are depicted in terms of their desire for successful integration within 
society, requiring a particular type of queer to emerge. Sentimentalizing the epidemic through 
the personal relationship between Beckett and Miller, Philadelphia “nationalize[s] the gay body 
by dequeering it” (Corber, 2003, p. 111). In doing so, the future is imagined as a place in which 
heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, live in harmonious proximity to one another. Such a vision 
of the future suggests that angry queers, queers who do not want to “fit in”, are disruptive to the 
social good—for why would anyone disapprove of harmony? Like the feminist killjoy, who 
“refuses to convene, to assemble, […] to meet up over happiness [or to] laugh at the right points” 
(Ahmed, 2010, p. 65), the angry queer is a figure of great disappointment. Queers who refuse the 
terms of heteronormative acceptance have little or no place in Philadelphia’s future. 
 Alternatively, by redefining the social and political problems of HIV/AIDS, Angels 
counters these sorts of hegemonic aspirations. AIDS is a problem in Angels insofar as it is 
constituted and lived through multiple axes of social and political marginalization, including 
race, class, sexuality, and capitalism. AIDS is fundamentally a queer issue such that the future of 
queer life depends upon our capacity to survive it, or to transform the social and political context 
in which it is lived. And yet, where Philadelphia permits Beckett to join “us” in the future to the 
extent that he impacts the law, Angels invites all of us—dead or alive, nameless or otherwise—to 




This Angel. She’s my favorite Angel. I like them best when they’re statuary. They 
commemorate death but suggest a world without dying. They are made of the heaviest 
things on earth, stone and iron, they weigh tons but they’re winged, they are engines and 
instruments of flight. […] The fountain’s not flowing now, they turn it off in the winter, 
ice in the pipes. But in the summer it’s a sight to see. I want to be around to see it. I plan 
to be. I hope to be. This disease will be the end of many of us, but not nearly all, and the 
dead will be commemorated and will struggle on with the living, and we are not going 
away. We won’t die secret deaths anymore. The world only spins forward. We will be 
citizens. The time has come (Kushner, p. 280). 
Prior’s alternative perception of time—in which the dead, dying, and surviving struggle 
together—counters a worldview in which queerness is finite;  although it seems as though AIDS 
may threaten to bring an end to queer life, Prior’s declaration suggests otherwise; through an 
engagement with the world of which we are apart, queerness will persist. In working towards, 
and in service of, a future in which sexual others and PWAs are visible and productive citizens, 
the future will depend on the survival of hope for those who have not been served by the present. 
As Jose Munoz has suggested, 
Queerness is not yet here. Queerness is an ideality. Put another way, we are not yet queer. 
We may never touch queerness, but we can feel it as the warm illumination of a horizon 
imbued with potentiality. We have never been queer, yet queerness exists for us as an 
ideality that can be distilled from the past and used to imagine the future. The future is 
queerness’s domain. Queerness is a structuring and educated mode of allows us to see 
and feel beyond the quagmire of the present (2009, p. 1). 
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Contrary to the logic of heteronormativity queerness is futural, rather than finite; forward, rather 
than backward. Prior’s role as Prophet is also suggestive of this concept. As Prophet, Prior not 
only has a future, he is responsible for the future; his capacity to see the future, and to shape it, 
ensure its very existence. Through Prior’s refusal to give up, to stop moving, Kushner bestows 
the queer body (and the ill body) the ability to give, rather than take, life. This counterlogic is not 
without its own misgivings, however, as scholars such as Heather Love have pointed out. Given 
the lengthy historical attachment of queerness to backwardness, death, and finitude, it has been 
tempting—at times obligatory—to insist otherwise:  
If modernism […] aimed to move humanity forward, it did so in part by perfecting 
techniques for mapping and disciplining subjects considered to be lagging behind […] 
For queers, having been branded as nonmodern or as a drag on the progress of 
civilization, the desire to be recognized as part of the modern social order is strong (Love, 
2007, p. 5-7).  
And yet, Love goes on to argue, to disavow backwardness altogether not only reifies 
backwardness as undesirable (ultimately shifting the blame to others), it also risks losing sight of 
the ways in which backwardness is inherent to queer life (p. 7). I maintain, however, that as 
much as Angels’ relies on the narrative of progress (albeit in queer form), it also revives alternate 
models of time.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has made a case for the idea that narratives about death, and about time, 
delineate the social and bodily surfaces of belonging. Moreover, “[t]he orchestration of the gaze 
upon the corpse has a long and broad history: how the dead, or simulations of the dead, are 
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depicted expresses the aesthetic, epistemological and political preoccupations of a particular 
cultural moment” (Tait, 2006, p. 49). In other words representations of the dead/dying are not 
simply artefacts; as much as they reveal about the broader social and political context in which 
they emerge, it is their very use at all—their purpose as objects of consumption across time—that 
constitutes their productivity. My intention has been to demonstrate the ways in which 
mainstream representations of death/the dead have shaped the AIDS body as an object of social 
exclusion through its figure as a living corpse—a body which is invariably marked by death. 
Alternatively, counterhegemonic representations of the AIDS body have harnessed the power of 
the dead to reconstruct queerness/AIDS as promising; that is, as capable of engagement with 
space and time. I contend that the phenomenology of AIDS is structured as much by intimacy as 
it is by temporality. In conclusion I examine more deeply the relation of the skin to 
representations of death/the dead, specifically for criminalized bodies. 
  Describing the public consumption of representations of the dead as “necrophilic” Sue 
Tait identifies the viewer as pleasure-seeker, “positioned to take pleasure from imagery of death, 
imagery which often penetrates the flesh” (p. 50). Tait designates the corpse, therefore, as an 
object around which bodies form affective attachments. While forms of public mourning and 
memorialization can unite bodies through their affective alignment with the dead, the 
consumption of the criminalized dead—by which I mean those bodies that are criminalized 
through their proximity to social/sexual deviance and social marginality—is often predicated on 
affective misalignment. Put another way, representations of the criminalized corpse are 
predicated on their social exclusion; their mainstream consumption reifies the boundaries of 
belonging through the “necrophilic” preoccupation with the viewing of such dead/dying. In fact, 
as I have argued, the AIDS body is constituted as a corpse even in life. Analysing advertisements 
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about AIDS spanning the early 1990s throughout the 2000s, Marco Scalvini has shown that early 
representations of AIDS were more likely to characterize PWAs as dead or near dead. Scalvini 
examines the infamous United Colours of Benetton ad, which depicts a man with AIDS 
surrounded by a grieving family: 
At the iconic level, the Benetton advert shows a body that, although still living, looks like 
a corpse. The body is twisted—distorted, macabre, and unnatural—so as to make one feel 
its agony in dying. The face is emaciated and projects suffering; it was touched up to 
resemble Christ’s face after crucifixion. Another sign of this sacred rendering is the bare 
and emaciated body clothed in white linen. […] At the communicative level, the observer 
cannot avoid participating in the drama of the dying body. Despite its commercial intent, 
the advertisement challenges society by reminding people of a body infected with HIV 
and eventually dying from AIDS. Through the unabated repetitiveness of the 
advertisement, the dying AIDS body became such a quotidian image that its cadaver-like 
quality was no longer invisible. (2010, p. 221) 
Scalvini’s sympathetic reading suggests that representations such as these challenged the 
mainstream to take these deaths seriously. I am curious, however, how the quotidian image of the 
cadaver-like AIDS body is performative of the idea that “queer becomes read a form of ‘non-
life’—with the death implied by being seen as non-reproductive—queers are perhaps already 
dead and cannot die” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 156). Already dead, the AIDS body cannot die, and 
therefore cannot be lost. In this case, these images derive pleasure through their capacity to make 
“us” feel alive; their cadaver-like quality solidifies the boundary between the living and the dead 
such that those who are unaffected by HIV/AIDS can feel more alive. 
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The desire Tait describes, to see what lies “beneath” the skin, is also a preoccupation with 
the skin itself—penetration of the flesh enacts a violent rupture of the body’s surface, a violation 
of its very essence (closedness, boundary). This analysis takes into account a gaze preoccupied 
with other “damages” to the surface of the corpse/living corpse (i.e. tears, fissures, diseases and 
disfigurements). In a later advertisement by Benetton, body parts were “branded” or tattooed 
with the words “HIV Positive.” Scalvini writes of the advertisement, 
At the communicative level Benetton adopted critical values in its campaign, the tattoo 
represents the discrimination against people who are ‘branded’ by society because of 
their disease. It is also evident how these tattoos parallel the stars that used to brand Jews 
during the Holocaust. Thus, the HIV tattoo symbolically represents the stigma and fear of 
carrying the physical and spiritual burden of the abnormality that is AIDS (2010, p, 221). 
Drawn into the symbolic relation with Holocaust, the HIV tattoo is a symbol burdened with 
death. This is not accidental. Following President Reagan’s public silence on the issue of 
HIV/AIDS, many argued that governmental inaction amounted to a purposeful “gay Holocaust.” 
Drawing attention to the fact that gay men were dying as a result of homophobic and 
heteronormative public health policy, the HIV tattoo became a defiant declaration. Queers and 
PWAs refused to live in silence, as the well-known “Silence=Death” slogan of the influential 
AIDS activist group ACT UP suggested. The HIV tattoo was also a reference to suggestions 
made early on in the epidemic that seropositive people receive involuntary tattoos to ensure the 
safety of the general public (see Brouwer). In this case the HIV tattoo would signal both the 
contagion of its host, as well as their impending death. Branded with this evidence the HIV tattoo 
would mark the AIDS body as, paradoxically, already dead (and therefore inconsequential) and 
also very much alive. As films such as Philadelphia demonstrate, KS became a ready substitute 
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for AIDSphobic identification. The surface of Beckett’s body is used to dramatize the boundaries 
between himself and the heteronormative (alive) world of which he is apart. Beckett’s “stigmata” 
is exaggerated (as in the revealing courtroom scene), along with his pallor as if to write the 
boundary into existence. Skin disturbances have been constituted and reconstituted 
intersectionally with social and sexual deviancy. Disfigured skins, like sexual outsiders, are 
marked by contagion. Consequently, queer/AIDS bodies are “skinned” as the “absent present 







Sick and delirious in bed, Prior is visited by two ghosts: his ancestors Prior Walters V 
and Prior Walters XVII. Taking note that Prior is ill, Prior Walters V comments on the epidemic 
of his own time: “The pestilence in my time was much worse than now. Whole villages of empty 
houses. You could look outdoors and see Death walking in the morning, dew dampening the 
ragged hem of his black robe. Plain as I can see you.” Prior responds, “You died of the plague.” 
To which his relative remarks, “The spotty monster. Like you, alone.” Prior’s ghostly ancestors 
are sent to introduce the Angel, Prior’s liaison with heaven. Speculating on why they were 
chosen Prior XVII says, “They chose us, I suspect, because of the mortal affinities. In a family as 
long-descended as the Walters there are bound to be a few carried off by the plague.” “The 
spotty monster,” adds Prior V. The comparison between “the spotty monster” and HIV/AIDS, 
with its accompanying lesions, is obvious. “The spotty monster,” or course, refers to smallpox, a 
disease characterized by large, pustular lesions covering any part of the body while “Black Jack” 
refers to the “Black Death,” one of the most fatal pandemics in history and comprised of several 
strains of bacterial infections. The appearance of Prior’s ancestors in the present dramatizes the 
unreliability of linear time to contain itself; through them, Kushner comments on the ways in 
which the past continues to haunt the present. The use of colloquial expressions to refer to 
smallpox and the plague evidence the history of illness as a social history—a history not only 
made up of scientific facts, but the social and cultural experience and construction of illness and 
the effect of these practices on our social relationships. The aesthetic quality of smallpox, for 
instance, was the primary literary concern of the illness. Portrayed as “Beauty’s Enemy,” the 
gendered implications were, as we might expect, staggering; women who survived the disease 
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were often thought of as better off dead because of the gross disfigurement it caused, leaving a 
woman with little to no chance of finding a mate (Shuttleton, 2007, p. 4).  
It is no coincidence that Kushner draws parallels between the spotted monster of the past, 
and the contemporary spotted monster, Kaposi’s sarcoma. Throughout this project I have made 
the claim that social belonging is inscribed on and through the skin. In doing so, I have extended 
the concept of the skin as a boundary separating (and yet mediating the relationship between) 
self from the world, to include the surfaces which constitute social belonging. Not only may we 
draw parallels between the surface of the body and the contours of social space but, as Ahmed 
contends, each is involved in a mutually productive relationship; social space impresses upon 
and shapes the body as it is itself produced and transformed by the bodies which inhabit it. I have 
argued that KS functions as a “stain” on Beckett’s body, much like the blackness of Joe’s skin. 
In doing so I have hoped to elucidate the ways in which the skin acts as repository for cultural 
imaginings of selfhood, health, and social belonging. The stain on Beckett’s skin signifies his 
failure to achieve and maintain bodily integrity. It is also indicative of his deeper moral 
pathology, homosexuality. In combination, the meanings of his skin construct his body as both 
pathological (a source of contagion) and already dead. Like the spotted monster of years past, 
Beckett’s (along with Cohn and Prior) illness is not only dramatized on the skin; illness is 
constructed through the skin, read from its surface as well as produced through its very existence 
as skin, as boundary.  
If Prior’s ancestors have something to offer his condition in the present, then Prior must 
also have something to bring forth into our present. Several scholars, including Tim Dean and 
Steven Bruhm, have suggested that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has altered our collective sense of 
time, particularly for queer people and others most affected by its outbreak: “[t]he altered tempo 
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of HIV disease has generated new uncertainties, new anxieties, new contingencies. In view of 
these changes, we might say that when one is exposed to HIV today, one is also newly exposed 
to time” (Dean, 2011, p. 76). Dean is referring to instability whereby the advancements in 
healthcare technology that have allowed many infected with HIV to live longer and more 
productive lives, have not yet produced a cure. People still die from AIDS complications, while 
many continue to live. For Bruhm “HIV’s own stubborn refusal to die” (that is, be cured) has 
meant that “the so-called ‘AIDS era’ has eluded any clearly demarcated temporal pain, a time in 
which we might have done our mourning and got it over with” (2011, p. 317). Haunted by a past, 
unsure about the future, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has undermined linear conceptions of time 
through the paradox of its deadly immortality: its staggering death toll, in combination with its 
viral persistence. As I have argued, Angels draws on this temporal confusion, inviting us all—
dead or alive, nameless or otherwise—to come together in service of the past, present, and 
future.  
The films in my analysis are historically specific; they are each set at a time earlier in the 
epidemic, a time in which scientific knowledge about the disease was far from where it is today, 
a time when massive numbers of those infected in North America continued to die, and when 
social and fiscal conservatism was dominating (or at least increasingly dividing) the nation. It is 
interesting, for instance, that whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s visibility was an increasingly 
important issue for the AIDS movement, particularly given President Reagan’s complete lack of 
attention to the issue, there is now a burgeoning investment in the politics of disclosure/privacy 
as a result of new legal precedents. And yet, the increasing criminalization—including the use of 
HIV-specific laws and general assault laws to prosecute and incarcerate cases of non-disclosure 
or exposure between sexual partners (even where transmission does not occur)—have brought to 
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the fore the ways in which HIV/AIDS continues to be a matter of boundaries: penetration, 
transmission, exposure, and T-cell count are increasingly subject to public and legal scrutiny 
while the boundaries constituting social belonging are becoming increasingly rigid with the 
threat of imprisonment. Although KS may have lost some of its cultural currency as an emblem 
of HIV/AIDS, the matter of skin—the surfaces of the body, as well as the contours of social 
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